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“The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.” 
Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat, 1979  
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Abstract 
In the coming decades, the World will be facing severe challenges in terms of 
water, energy and food through increased water use, increased energy demand and 
increased food demand and shifting diets. Those challenges are foreseen to be amplified 
due to climate change effects. Egypt is a country struggling to achieve water, energy and 
food security, which are key issues in achieving national security. Egypt is facing another 
major challenge regarding its main water resource Nile River. Ethiopia is currently 
undergoing the construction of a huge dam on the Blue Nile which is the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD). The purpose of the research is to attempt to mitigate the 
effect of the GERD on Egypt through cooperation with the Nile Basin countries on their 
Water-Energy-Food Nexus (WEF Nexus).  
The grand Ethiopian Renaissance dam (GERD) is a mega hydro-electric project 
currently under construction on the Blue Nile. It is planned to have a 74 BCM capacity 
reservoir and a power generation capacity of 6,000 MW. If not agreed appropriately, the 
filling of the GERD reservoir might have significant impacts on the Aswan High Dam.  
A policy framework was developed for the water-energy-food nexus for Egypt 
and the Nile Basin. In Egypt, it is suggested to create a Supreme Council for Water, 
Energy and Food which includes all the relevant ministries. For the Nile Basin, a Nile 
Basin WEF is suggested, whose decisions should be legally binding for Nile Basin 
countries. Examples were provided on the project/programme level that could have 
benefited from the WEF synergy, like the reclamation of 1.5 million feddans and the 
expansion of the electricity generation sector. An institutional arrangement was 
developed, which is applicable for Egypt and the Nile Basin countries. The arrangement 
is done through a methodology which encourages the prioritization of projects that take 
into consideration the WEF nexus. On the Nile Basin level, examples were given for 
potential projects that could benefit from the WEF synergy if the basin is thought of as 
one unit. Examples provided included the expansion of green water utilization and 
integration of electricity grids. The policy framework showed that the GERD itself can be 
13 
viewed as an opportunity for cooperation if the right policy framework is developed 
among the basin countries.   
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Chapter One: Introduction and Research Problem 
1.1 Global Challenges in the Water, Energy and Food Sectors 
Water, energy and food security are far from being achieved globally. A large 
number of people globally lack basic services. About 0.9 billion people do not have 
access to an improved water source, 2.6 billion are deprived of safe sanitation, 1.3 billion 
do not have electricity access, 1.5 billion lack access to modern cooking energy forms 
and 1 billion suffer from hunger regularly (BMU and BMZ, 2011). Many people are 
deprived of basic human rights and are not even given any opportunity for development. 
Nevertheless, and despite this situation, the world has reached and exceeded sustainable 
limits of resource consumption. The world is in need to the development of innovative 
and well-integrated solutions to achieve sustainable growth. 
In the coming decades, the world will be facing severe challenges in terms of 
water, energy and food: 
 Increased water use: Historically, freshwater withdrawals have increased at rates 
higher than population growth rates. This implies that the growth in freshwater 
demand will increase even more than the population growth rate (World 
Economic Forum, 2011). A recent study suggested that the World could be facing 
a shortage of 40% in available freshwater as compared to the water demand by 
2030 (McKinsey & Company, 2009). A large number of countries are already 
using ground water at rates faster than renewed, including Mexico, China, India 
and Jordan (UNDP, 2007). If water continues to be used in this unsustainable 
manner, it is expected that two thirds of the world’s population will suffer from 
water stress by 2030 (FAO, 2007). 
 Increased energy demand: It is forecasted that the world will need 40% more 
energy by 2030 compared to the current levels (IEA, 2009). For example, by 
2030, China is expected to expand its electricity generation capacity by at least 
1,300 GW, while India will need an additional 400 GW (Project Catalyst, 2009). 
Many countries prioritize access to energy. Currently, 1.5 billion people lack 
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electricity access, while more than 3 billion people still utilize biomass for their 
thermal requirements (AGECC, 2010). 
 Increased food demand and shifting diets: The demand for food will continue to 
increase in the coming decades due to the growth of the World population by an 
additional 2.7 billion people, increasing incomes, and additional meat 
consumption. The growing population of the world will need more and different 
types of food. As the living standards improve and population become more 
urban, the demand will increase for resource intensive types of food such as meat. 
The global meat demand is expected to increase by 50% by 2025, leading also to 
a 42% increase in the demand for grain (UNEP, 2009). This is expected to limit 
the purchasing power of the poor even further in a world where currently one 
billion people suffer from hunger (World Economic Forum, 2011).  
The above-mentioned challenges are even expected to be amplified by climate change 
effects. Climate change is expected to increase water stress in large parts of the World, 
causing 75-220 million people to suffer from fiercer water shortages by 2020. Shrinking 
agricultural land, distorted growing seasons and increased uncertainty on suitable crops to 
grow are expected to reduce agricultural productivity. Crops depending on rain are 
expected to drop by as much as 50% by 2020. This is expected to worsen the situation of 
food security, pushing more people into hunger in the coming few decades (UNFCCC, 
2007). For example, in East Africa small farmers depending on marginal land are already 
suffering from big variations in rainfall patterns. In addition, they are facing low yields 
due to dropping soil fertility, erosion and drought. People in these areas depend on maize 
and beans for their livelihood, but are currently highly vulnerable to adverse climate 
change effects (WMO, 2012). 
Climate change is expected to increase nexus challenges. Temperatures are 
expected to increase, soil is expected to dry out, storms are expected to intensify and 
glaciers are expected to reduce in size. Power production especially that is based on 
hydroelectricity is threatened as a result of droughts. Both the energy and food sectors are 
contributing sectors to climate change through emitting greenhouse gases and they will 
also be affected by climate change (BMU and BMZ, 2011).  
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1.2 The Egyptian Context 
Egypt is a country struggling to achieve water, energy and food security. 
Achieving security in these three sectors is a key issue in achieving national security. The 
failure of the State to provide the population’s water, energy and food requirements might 
be a reason for social instability leading to riots and political instability. 
In terms of water, Egypt is mainly relying on the Nile River, from which it 
currently receives 55.5 BCM per year as per the 1959 Nile Waters agreement. Egypt’s 
total annual renewable water resources are currently around 700 m3 per capita, which 
puts Egypt in the water scarcity zone as per the United Nations classification (UN, 2014). 
This figure is expected to reach 550 m3 per capita per year by 2025 (The Brookings 
Institution, 2012).   
In the energy sector, Egypt has experienced during the years following the 2011 
revolution its worst energy crisis in decades. In addition to the fact that the current 
installed capacity of around 27 GW does not meet the peak demand, there are huge 
shortages of fossil fuels, mainly natural gas. This has led to major blackouts during the 
years after the 2011 revolution. The country is also unable to keep regular energy supply 
to the industry especially energy intensive industries. By the end of April 2014, the 
government owed its oil & gas foreign partners US$ 6 billion (Adel, 2014) . In order to 
overcome an expected deficit of 2.4 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas, the 
government is heading towards importing coal, a carbon intensive fuel (Adel, 2014). The 
cement industry is currently opting for importing coal, to overcome the irregularities of 
the supply of natural gas from the government.  
Looking at food security, Egypt is a net importing country; it currently imports 
45-55% of its wheat consumption (IFPRI, 2013). This makes Egypt highly vulnerable to 
international price fluctuations. With higher international prices and lower foreign 
currency income in the years post the 2011 revolution from tourism, exports and foreign 
direct investments, the balance of payments deficit has become much wider (IFPRI, 
2013). The current situation thus places serious question marks on Egypt’s energy, water 
and food security. 
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1.3 Research Problem 
In addition to the above challenges, Egypt is facing another major challenge 
regarding its main water resource Nile River. Ethiopia is currently undergoing the 
construction of a major dam on the Blue Nile: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
(GERD). Other dams are also planned to be built as the total potential for hydropower in 
Ethiopia is estimated around 45,000 MW of which only 3% is being currently utilized. 
The purpose of the research is to study possible mitigation of the effect of the GERD on 
Egypt through developing its WEF nexus locally and the cooperation with the Nile Basin 
countries using the WEF nexus.  
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Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
The aim of this section is to explain how the key research questions in this thesis 
were developed. It will also explain the methodology followed in order to reach the 
answers to the research questions through a systematic research approach.  
2.1 Research Problem 
Egypt is already facing huge challenges in terms of energy, water and food 
security. The three sectors are very well interconnected and deficiencies in one sector 
cause shortages in the other two sectors. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 
is expected to have negative impacts on Egypt’s water security. This will in turn affect 
Egypt’s food security and energy security due to the interconnections between the three 
sectors.   
2.2 Main Research Question 
The main research question is whether developing a policy framework for a WEF 
Nexus for the Nile Basin can help Egypt overcome the additional stress on its water 
resources caused by the GERD. The hypothesis is that developing such a nexus will help 
Egypt both internally through coordinating its policies in the three sectors and on the Nile 
Basin level will help overcome the problem and open new opportunities for cooperation 
among the Nile Basin countries in the three sectors.  
Egypt has always held the position that it will not give up on one drop of its 
“historical rights” in the Nile water. In addition, all previous agreements and initiatives 
have been focused solely on the water issue. The problem is that when looking at the 
water alone, the negotiation process turns into a win-lose process. Since the Nile water is 
a finite resource, whatever water Ethiopia gains Egypt has to lose. The main hypothesis 
in this thesis is that the situation with the Nile Basin countries can be turned into a win-
win situation if we zoom out to include the water, energy and food sectors into the 
equation. This means for example that Ethiopia can withhold part of the Nile water in 
return for power transmitted through the integration of the power grids of the Nile Basin 
19 
countries or through giving Egypt the opportunity to plant parts of the Ethiopian land 
which receives adequate rainfall for agriculture. 
2.3 Minor Research Question 
In addition to the main research question mentioned above, the thesis also 
examines whether creating a policy framework for a WEF nexus for Egypt can help the 
country face the upcoming challenges in the three sectors. It also tackles whether it is 
possible to have a complete integration with the Nile Basin countries through the concept 
of virtual water trade.  
2.4 Research Design 
The research conducted in this thesis relies mainly on a desk study of a literature 
review including the following sources: 
 Reports from international organizations on the WEF nexus and its global 
emergence in the past few years. Those included UNESCO, UN ESCAP, 
UNDP, FAO, the World Bank and the World Food Program.  
 Journal articles and studies to assess the issue of virtual water trade in the Nile 
Basin. Those included the Journal of Global Environmental Change, the 
Journal of Hydrology, studies by FAO and the Nile Basin Initiative, a PhD 
Thesis from Delft University and a study from King’s College in London.  
 Journal articles and studies to assess Ethiopia’s water, energy and food 
security situation and its plans to build dams on the Blue Nile. Those included 
the Journal of the American Water Resources Association, Journal of Asian 
and African Studies, Water Policy, Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 
Mountain Research and Development, Journal of Water Resources Planning 
and Management, in addition to reports from Oxfam, the World Water 
Council, UNDP, the World Bank, FAO, World Food Program   
After the above literature is examined and analyzed, a policy framework for the 
WEF nexus in Egypt and the Nile Basin countries will be developed. There were no 
previous attempts to propose such a policy framework for Egypt or the Nile Basin. The 
20 
framework will tackle cooperation from a WEF nexus perspective and will not be only 
limited to water issues.  
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
3.1 Emergence of the Water-Energy-Food Nexus Globally 
During the period from the 16th till the 18th of November, 2011, roughly 550 
people gathered in Bonn in order to attend a conference called “The Water, Energy and 
Food Security Nexus – Solutions for the Green Economy”. The German government 
organized the conference in order to bring key stakeholders from the three sectors 
together, with the aim of collaboration and brainstorming solutions for cross-cutting 
problems. The conference gave the first opportunity for both experts and politicians from 
a large number of countries from all three sectors to collectively develop the nexus steps 
(Martin-Nagle et al., 2011). 
The nexus approach offers huge potential to improve resource efficiency and 
provide benefits related to production and consumption through addressing externalities 
across the sectors. The nexus focuses on overall system efficiency and not merely 
isolated sectors productivity, and hence maximizes benefits provided to societies. A 
better integrated process of developing policy accounting for cross-sectoral external costs 
will improve overall resource efficiency and provide more equitable benefit sharing, as 
opposed to conventional approaches which only improve sectoral resource productivity 
(Martin-Nagle et al., 2011). 
The benefits from the Nexus approach should encourage governments, private 
sectors, and the civil society to collaborate. Those include for example addressing 
intensive agriculture which utilizes less water but uses more energy than traditional 
agriculture. The nexus approach would address the energy intensity of desalination, water 
requirements for renewable energy production and water requirements for afforestation. 
Management across the sectors can help improve overall resource efficiency. It is 
possible in multi-use systems to utilize waste and un-useful by-products to be resources 
to other products and services. The nexus approach can also use economic instruments to 
improve resource efficiency. Governance, institutions and policy coherence can help 
guide investments that minimize negative externalities. Capacity building is also needed 
to manage the complexity of cross-sectoral approaches (Hoff, 2011). 
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The WEF Nexus has become part of the international development efforts and is 
acknowledged as a policy paradigm. Table 1 examines how the WEF nexus is portrayed 
in different documents and initiatives of international organizations. 
Table 1 - Nexus Elements in Major Documents and Initiatives (UN ESCAP, 2013) 
 Entity Views on the Nexus Documents/Meeting 
1 Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United 
Nations 
The FAO views the energy-
agriculture as a coherent 
system. Bioenergy could be 
used to improve agricultural 
productivity for rural 
development. It links 
between energy, biomass 
and carbon flows. 
The Energy and Agriculture 
Nexus, 2000. Energy and 
Natural Resources Working 
Paper No. 4 
2 United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific 
WEF security is considered 
as one of the resource 
efficiency strategies. 
Low Carbon Green Growth 
Roadmap for Asia and the 
Pacific, 2012 
3 Asian Development Bank Adopts the nexus 
perspective as one its 12 
key messages.  
Asian Water Development 
Outlook 2013: Measuring 
Water Security in Asia and 
the Pacific 
4 Transatlantic Academy Looks at the WEF security 
from a broader perspective 
which includes land and 
minerals. 
The Global Resource Nexus: 
The Struggles for Land, 
Energy, Food, Water and 
Minerals, 2012 
5 Stockholm Environment 
Institute 
Pushes for reducing trade-
offs and generating more 
benefits among the nexus 
elements. 
Prepared the background 
paper for Bonn 2011 Nexus 
6 International Food Policy Publishes article on the 
food-water-climate change 
A co-organizer of the Bonn 
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Research Institute nexus in a number of 
scientific journals. 
2011 Nexus Conference 
7 International Energy 
Agency 
Focuses on water 
requirements for energy 
generation and estimates 
freshwater needs by energy 
source and region. 
World Energy Outlook 2012 
8 The World Bank Issued a report on the 
importance of river 
resources for the WEF 
nexus. 
Overcoming Barriers to 
International Cooperation of 
River Basins Critical for 
Food, Water, Energy 
Security, 2012 
9 United Nations Conference 
on Sustainable 
Development 
Covered the topics of food 
security, water and 
sanitation, and energy. 
Outcome document “The 
Future We Want”, 2012 
10 Asia- Pacific Center for 
Water Security, Tsinghua 
and Peking Universities 
Collaborated with ADB for 
publishing the Third Water 
Development Outlook for 
Asia and the Pacific. 
Established a regional 
program on R&D on WFE 
security, 2013 
 
3.2 Linkages among Water, Energy and Food 
Connections among food, energy, and water are numerous and complex. This 
section examines the most important links among the three sectors. The main inter-
relationships between water, energy and food are shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 - Schematic of the WFE nexus and its constituent issues (UN ESCAP, 2013) 
3.2.1 Water for Food and Water for Energy 
The most evident inter-relation in the WEF nexus is agriculture, which has been 
practiced by humans for many thousands of years. The largest consumer of freshwater 
worldwide is agriculture for food and fiber production. Table 2 shows that the amount of 
water withdrawals for agriculture worldwide is around 69%. Large amounts of water are 
also used for energy production. That includes extraction of fossil fuels, mining, refining 
processing and electricity generation. Water is also used for growing biofuel feedstock. 
On the other hand, energy is used for water pumping, treatment and distribution as well 
as for the treatment of the resulting waste water. We should however differentiate 
between electricity generation which returns most of the withdrawn water and agriculture 
which does not (Finley & Seiber, 2014). Between 15% and 35% of global water 
withdrawals are not sustainable, meaning that water usage is used faster than it can be 
replenished (Dupont & Thirlwell, 2011).  
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Table 2 - Water withdrawal by sector, around 2007 (FAO, 2014) 
Region Total withdrawal by sector Total water 
withdrawal 
(BCM/year) 
Total freshwater 
withdrawal 
(BCM/year) 
Municipal Industrial Agricultural 
BCM/year % BCM/year % BCM/year % 
Africa 27 13 11 5 174 82 213 199 
Americas 130 15 288 34 430 51 847 843 
Asia 228 9 244 10 2035 81 2507 2373 
Europe 72 22 188 57 73 22 333 332 
Oceania 5 26 3 15 11 60 18 17 
World 462 12 734 19 2722 69 3918 3763 
 
3.2.2 Energy for Food 
The food sector is globally also highly dependent on energy. The production of 
food and the associated supply chain consume around 30% of the World energy 
consumption. That includes the energy required for primary production; energy used for 
drying, cooling and storage; energy used for food transportation; processing of food and 
beverage; and preparation and cooking (FAO, 2011).  
In agriculture, farmers use energy inputs to improve processes that occur naturally 
so that a given piece of land or amount of water would actually yield more product than it 
would naturally do. The significant fossil fuel consumption in all phases of the food 
system helped meet the amount of food required globally by a growing population in the 
past 100 years. Transportation of food in vessels, tractors, trucks and other vehicles 
consume oil products. Chemical fertilizers and pesticides consume natural gas. Electricity 
and heat generated by fossil fuels are used to process, refrigerate and package food. 
Cooking also consumes a wide range of fossil fuels (FAO, 2011). 
 The interconnections between energy and food are best shown through the prices. 
The boom in food prices reached its peak during July 2008, when the average price of 
crude oil went up 94% from a year earlier reaching US$ 133/barrel. Within only five 
months of 2008, rice prices increased from US$ 375/ton in January to $757/ton in June 
(Baffes & Haniotis, 2010). The IMF’s index for internationally traded food commodities 
prices increased 56% during the period from January 2007 to June 2008 (Mitchell, 2008). 
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Figure 2 shows how commodity prices tend to be linked with energy prices. During the 
period from 2000 to 2010, wheat and crude oil prices have nearly tripled, and rice and 
corn prices have almost doubled. Increases in oil prices since 2003 have resulted in more 
demand for biofuels. The process of converting vegetable oil to biodiesel is cost-effective 
if vegetable oil is much cheaper than diesel. It is also possible for farmers to switch to 
vegetable oil crops from food crops in case it is more profitable for them. Therefore, 
cereals prices are connected to vegetable oil prices, and hence to crude oil prices (Kim, 
2010). 
 
Figure 2 - Comparative trends of crop commodity and oil price indices from 1990 to 2009 (with 2004 
as baseline) (Kim, 2010) 
3.2.3 Desalination: Energy for Water 
Desalination is an energy intensive process. Given the advancement of 
desalination technologies, desalinated water can now be produced at a cost lower than 
US$ 0.50/m3. It is also expected that the advancement of new state-of-the-art desalination 
technologies like adsorption desalination will bring the required amounts of energy and 
the associated cost down in the future (Ghaffour et al., 2012). The growth rate of the 
desalination capacity worldwide is currently at an astonishing annual rate of 55% (Global 
Water Intelligence, 2014). 
There are two main types of desalination technologies: thermal desalination using 
thermal energy and/or electricity and membrane desalination using only electricity. 
Thermal desalination depends on processes which change the physical state of water or 
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distillate via evaporation. On the other hand, membrane desalination utilizes processes 
which use a membrane employing the concept of filtration (Al-Karaghouli et al., 2009). 
Currently the most dominant desalination technologies are the Reverse Osmosis (RO), a 
membrane technology, constituting 60% of the global capacity and the Multi Stage Flash 
(MSF), a thermal technology, constituting 27% of the global capacity. The distribution of 
the desalination technology market is shown in Figure 3. The suitability of each 
technology depends on a lot of factors like energy availability and pricing, water quality 
and technical resources available in the region (IRENA, 2012). The main sources of 
water for desalination are sea water and brackish groundwater which amount to 58% and 
23% of feed water for desalination globally respectively (Al-Karaghouli at al., 2009). The 
types of desalination technologies are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3 - Desalination Technology Market (Koschikowski, 2011) 
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Figure 4 – Seawater Desalination Processes (Al-Karaghouli et al., 2009) 
3.2.4 Biofuels: Food for Energy 
The term biofuel refers to solid, liquid or gaseous fuels that are produced from 
bio-renewable or combustible renewable feedstock (Demirbas, 2007). The two main 
biofuels used as transportation fuels are bioethanol and biodiesel. Those two can 
potentially replace gasoline and diesel fuel respectively. The feedstock used for 
producing bioethanol is almost only food crops. Demand for biodiesel has increased in 
some markets due to its low carbon emissions. The main idea behind biofuels is that they 
are carbon neutral because their carbon emissions are re-absorbed by the plants in the 
photosynthesis process as the plants are renewable (Demirbas, 2006). Biofuels are 
classified according to their production technologies as shown in Table 3.  
Table 3 - Classification of renewable biofuels based on their production technologies (Demirbas, 
2009) 
Generation Feedstock Example 
First generation biofuels Sugar, starch, vegetable 
oils, or animal fats 
Bioalcohols, vegetable oil, 
Biodiesel, biosyngas, biogas 
Second generation biofuels Non-food crops, wheat 
straw, corn, wood, solid 
Bioalcohols, bio-oil, bio-
DMF, Biohydrogen, bio-
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waste, energy crops Fischer–Tropsch diesel, 
wood diesel 
Third generation biofuels Algae Vegetable oil, biodiesel 
Fourth generation biofuels Vegetable oil, biodiesel Biogasoline 
 
 The most commonly used biofuel is ethanol, which is an alcohol fermented from 
sugar, starch or cellulosic biomass. Its production on the commercial level comes mainly 
from sugar cane and beet root because starch and cellulosic biomass need costly 
preparation. In addition to its use as a biofuel, it is used in the manufacturing cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals and alcoholic beverages. 
3.3 Danger of Ignoring the Water-Energy-Food Nexus 
The mismanagement of the Water-Energy-Food Nexus globally was one of the 
main reasons of the 2008 global food crisis. In 2008, the World Bank warned that 33 
countries were vulnerable to social unrest due to the rapid increase in food prices, as 105 
million people were pushed into poverty. Finance ministers gathered in April 2008 to 
discuss the global food shortages. It was reported that in informal discussions they 
blamed the U.S. policies on biofuels. The U.S. methanol made from corn could have been 
exported to feed the hungry (Davis & Belkin, 2008). Demand for biofuels was one of the 
main reasons for the sharp increase in food prices during the period from 2006 to 2008. 
The high global energy prices pushed developing countries’ governments to support the 
production of biofuels though a set of policy instruments. The global biofuels production 
tripled during the period from 2000 to 2007 (Dupont & Thirlwell, 2011). According to 
Baffes and Haniotis (2010), prices of agricultural commodities were affected by both 
unfavorable weather conditions and the shift of food commodities to biofuels production, 
especially maize in the U.S. and edible oils in Europe. The danger biofuels pose on food 
security is best illustrated by the fact filling a car tank with biofuel uses as much as the 
annual cereals consumption of a poor person (Kim, 2010). 
The growing demand for food has in many cases affected both water quality and 
quantity. Poor irrigation management has previously caused water depletion, water 
quality deterioration, waterlogging and salinization. In addition, extraction of 
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groundwater at unsustainable rates for agriculture has caused lowering of water tables 
and saltwater intrusion at coastal areas. For example, in North China groundwater levels 
are falling by around 1 meter per year. Water withdrawals for agriculture have caused 
severe water quality problems through changes in stream flows. On the other hand, 
contaminated water supplies have affected food quality leading to health hazards, as 
untreated waste water and contaminated surface water were often used in agriculture in 
developing countries (Rosegrant et al., 2002). It has been reported that untreated waste 
water was used for irrigating more than 500,000 hectares in Latin America only 
(Cavallini, 1996). The average irrigation efficiency is very low in developing countries, 
well below what can be achieved (Rosegrant et al., 2002).  
3.4 Examples of the Inevitable Water-Energy-Food Interconnections 
from the World 
Saudi Arabia is an example of an arid developing country rich in energy 
resources. It is estimated that 9% of the electricity consumption of the country is used for 
obtaining water either through groundwater pumping or desalination (Siddiqi & Anadon, 
2011). Abderrahman (2010) demonstrates how in Saudi Arabia, the scarcity of water 
resources was solved by the abundance of energy resources. In order to meet the growing 
demand for water for domestic, industrial and agricultural purposes, 35 dual purpose 
desalination plants, multi-stage ash distillation (MSF) and Reverse Osmosis (RO), were 
constructed on both the Red Sea and the Gulf coasts for water production. In addition, the 
MSF plants contribute about 20% of Saudi Arabia’s national electricity. Moreover, 
energy is used to pump water from 85,000 wells that were drilled to meet the demand for 
irrigation water.  
Jordan is one of the most water stressed countries in the World with annual 
renewable water supplies of just 161m3 per capita. Jordan shares most of its surface water 
with neighboring countries, whose practices have deprived Jordan of its fair water share. 
The problem was even intensified by high population growth rates and the large number 
of refugees Jordan hosts (Michel et al., 2012). Although water desalination seems like the 
logical approach to be adopted, Hadadin et al. (2010) highlight that water desalination is 
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currently confined to a small number of industrial facilities which desalinate water for 
their own use. The main source of water used for desalination is brackish water available 
throughout the country and seawater at the Gulf of Aqaba. They argue that desalination 
should be one of the major measures Jordan has to implement, given that the technology 
is available and proven. Its cost has decreased from US$1.50 to around US$0.63 per m3 
under ideal conditions. Østergaard et al. (2014) study energy sytem’s impacts of different 
desalination technologies in Jordan. They use the Energy PLAN model to model the 
entire energy system including electricity, cooling. heating, cooling, and industrial energy 
demands. They conclude that reverse osmosis (RO) driven by electricity and Multi Stage 
Flash (MSF) desalination driven by Cogeneration of Heat and Power (CHP) are similar in 
fuel use. As a heavily water stressed country, Jordan should pay more attention to the 
WEF nexus which can help it mitigate its water scarcity problem.  
China is listed by the United Nations as one of 13 countries suffering from severe 
water scarcity. Although China has 21% of the World population, it only has 6% of 
freshwater supply. However, due to the cheap water prices, desalination still remains as 
an economically infeasible solution (Wong, 2013). Kahrl & Roland-Holst (2008) 
examine the relationships between energy and water in China, with a special focus on 
energy requirements for water use. They conclude that energy used for providing water 
not used for agriculture is only a minor portion of the Chinese energy consumption, but it 
is expected to increase together with the increase in water treatment capacity. They also 
found energy-water price interactions of minor relevance to policy makers because of low 
water prices, but this is likely to change by time due to the high energy intensity of water 
treatment facilities. Finally, they concluded that shifting of water from agricultural to 
non-agricultural uses will have significant energy implications. Regarding water use for 
energy purposes, the National Development Reform Commission has officially cancelled 
plans for the construction of coal-to-liquids (CTL) plants in response to concerns about 
drought problems. This is due to the fact that CTL processes are highly water intensive, 
so they are likely to affect both water availability and quality (Xinhua News, 2006).   
Sovacool & Sovacool (2009) highlight the locations in the United States most 
likely to face severe water shortages resulting from additions of thermoelectric capacity. 
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They argue that many electric utilities have paid little attention to water scarcity issues 
and have continued to include in their plans new water intensive nuclear and fossil fuel 
based power plants. They focus on Houston, Texas; Atlanta, Georgia; Las Vegas, 
Nevada; and New York, to have a deep understanding of the likely water and electricity 
challenges they might soon face. Their policy recommendations include improving the 
cooling cycles of conventional power plants, discontinuing the construction of power 
plants which have once-through cooling cycles, modifying provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act concerning the licensing of new power plants, seeking quick 
demand side energy efficiency improvements and implementing renewable energy 
projects to replace thermal power plants. 
Stillwell et al. (2011) examine the energy-water nexus in Texas, specifically the 
relation between electricity generation and water resources. They study water 
requiremenets for electricity generation and energy requirements for water supply and 
waste water treatment. They included the following policy recommendations: 
1. Applications for new power plants should include an assessment of the 
implications of the different alternatives for cooling options in terms of both water 
and energy efficiency. 
2. New fossil fuel based or CSP power plants should clearly demonstrate water 
availability at the selected site. The demonstartion should take into consideration 
average rainfall and the availability of water during extreme drought. 
3. The State should provide incentives for power plants implementing water efficient 
cooling technologies like air-cooling or hybrid wet-dry cooling. 
4. The State should provide guidance to water suppliers and waste water treatment 
providers for the quantification of energy use and water conservation benefits. 
3.5 Egypt’s Water Challenges 
3.5.1 Water Shortage 
Egypt’s location is in a dry climate area; its rainfall is rare and most of its land is 
desert. Egypt has a fixed water quota from the Nile and a deep non-renewable 
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groundwater aquifer, which will be depleted if used in a non-sustainable manner. Water 
shortage is an important constraint facing Egypt’s economic development (Allam & 
Allam, 2007). In addition, Egypt faces rapid population growth and massive levels of 
water pollution. Water scarcity issues are expected to have severe impacts on national 
economy, social stability, human health and livelihoods of citizens (Luzi, 2010). Egypt is 
currently meeting its water demand which exceeds its available resources by more than 
25% through re-using agricultural wastewater as shown in Table 4. The vast majority of 
the Nile water (around 88%) is used in agricultural fields, while municipal and industrial 
uses account for about 7% and 5% respectively. Water not used up by crops seeps 
through the soil to the drainage system. Figure 5 shows how drainage water is recycled 
both officially and unofficially (Barnes, 2012). Along the Nile, drainage canals discharge 
water into the river. Moreover, pumps are used to lift water from the drainage canals to 
the irrigation system for re-use at multiple points. This represents the official re-use of 
the drainage water. Illegal uses are represented by farmers using the drainage water 
directly for irrigation.  
Table 4 – Egypt’s Water Uses and Available Resources in Year 2000 (Allam & Allam, 2007) 
Water Uses (BCM/year) Water Resources (BCM/year) 
Sector Amount Resource Amount 
Municipalities 5.25 Nile river 55.50 
Industry 3.50 Groundwater (Delta and Valley) 5.50 
River Transport 0.25 Deep Groundwater 0.80 
Agriculture 63.00 Drainage Water Reuse  
        - Canals in the Delta Region 4.50 
        - Nile river and Bahr Youssef 5.00 
        - Illegal Uses 3.00 
  Wastewater Reuse 0.20 
  Rain fall and Flash Floods 0.50 
  Evaporation Losses -3.00 
Total 72.00 Total 72.00 
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Figure 5 – The Nile’s water cycle (Barnes, 2012) 
3.5.2 Water Pollution 
Although drainage water is in important resource in facing water scarcity, its re-use in 
the irrigation system causes significant change in the water quality. Pollutants existing in 
the drainage system can cause harm to the environment and public health. In addition, 
this jeopardizes the possibility of exporting Egyptian products to markets having 
stringent quality standards. This also causes troubles to water treatment plants which 
produce drinking water to the population. Although the different pollutants are of concern 
for specific crops, water salinity is one of the main concerns for all farmers. The average 
salinity of water in the main drains is 565 ppm, but can reach up to 6000 ppm. For most 
crops, irrigation with saline water leads to lower yields. For example, irrigating with a 
water of salinity 1000 ppm causes the yield to be around 70% of that with fresh water 
(Barnes, 2012).  
In addition to the water pollution due to re-using drainage water, the continuous 
increase in the population associated with the expansion in industry and urbanized areas 
has caused deterioration in water quality in Egypt. The southern part of Lake Nasser has 
the best water quality as it is clear of any pollution sources except for few agricultural 
activities on its banks. In the Nile valley area from Aswan to Cairo, the Nile is exposed to 
numerous pollution sources which include untreated and semi-treated industrial 
wastewater, sewage water, agricultural drainage water, and solid liquid waste from Nile 
cruise activities (Allam & Allam, 2007). In addition, levels of bacteria are higher than the 
acceptable limits for municipal use and irrigation. In the Rosetta branch, bacterial 
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pollution is present with a high level of ammonia. Damietta branch also has high salinity 
and ammonia levels (Drainage Research Institute, 1996). 
3.6 Egypt’s Energy Challenges 
Egypt is a major producer of oil in Africa, as it is the largest non OPEC 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil producer in Africa. It is also the 
second largest producer of Natural gas in Africa after Algeria (U.S. EIA, 2014). 
However, Egypt’s large population and economic growth have significantly increased the 
demand for energy in all sectors including the residential, transportation and industrial 
sectors. Energy consumption has thus increased considerably during the previous few 
decades. Energy production in Egypt has been dominated by fossil fuels: oil and natural 
gas. However, Egypt has never been a major oil producer when compared to the Gulf 
states (Bahgat, 2013).  
In 2013, Egypt’s total primary energy consumption was around 1.7 million bbl/d 
of oil equivalent (BP, 2014).  Natural gas and oil are the main fuels used to meet the 
energy demand and constitute around 94% of the total consumption. While oil is the 
dominant fuel in the transportation sector, natural gas is used in power generation sector, 
industry sector and transportation sector in the form of compressed natural gas (CNG) 
(U.S. EIA, 2014). The primary energy consumption by fuel for Egypt in 2013 is shown in 
Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 - Primary energy consumption in Egypt, by fuel, 2013 (U.S. EIA, 2014) 
3.6.1 Oil 
Egypt’s annual oil consumption has increased by almost 3% during the last 
decade. It averaged around 770,000 bbl/d in 2013. Egypt was able to meet its oil demands 
domestically till the year 2010 when consumption surpassed the production, as shown in 
Figure 7. On the other hand, Egypt’s oil production averaged just below 700,000 bbl/d in 
2013. Egypt’s oil production has been declining for over 10 years now from a peak of 
over 900,000 bbl/d in mid 1990s. Although the year 2008 witnessed an increase of 
production, mainly from the Western Desert and some offshore areas, the total production 
returned to the declining pattern afterwards (U.S. EIA, 2014).  
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Figure 7 - Oil production and consumption in Egypt (U.S. EIA, 2014) 
3.6.2 Natural Gas 
Egypt’s production of natural gas has declined annually by an average of 3% from 
2009 to 2013 (U.S. EIA, 2014). In 2013, Egypt produced around 2.0 Tcf of natural gas of 
which 1.9 Tcf was consumed locally and while 0.1 Tcf was exported. Although 
significant gas discoveries have been made in the off shore Mediterranean and other 
areas, those fields have not been developed due to the low price the government is willing 
to pay to foreign operators. Another barrier to increasing gas production is the huge debt 
that Egypt owes foreign operators, amounting US$ 7.5 billion as of June 2014  (U.S. EIA, 
2014). In order to meet the rising domestic demand, the government has been diverting 
natural gas supply from exports to the domestic market especially the power generation 
sector. As a result, Egyptian gas exports have declined at an annual rate of 30% between 
2010 and 2013. In January 2014, BG Group declared Force Majeure notices regarding its 
LNG agreements in Egypt as a result of diversions of gas volume to the domestic market 
beyond the contracted arrangements (BG, 2014). Figure 8 shows the natural gas 
production and consumption in Egypt through the last decade. 
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Natural gas shortages were the main reason for the energy crisis in Egypt in the 
previous years. The power sector is dependent on natural gas by as much as 70%, and the 
energy intensive industries which are the cement, iron & steel and fertilizers industries 
are almost exclusively dependent on natural gas. For that reason, the natural gas 
shortages caused huge problems in both sectors during the last four years. 
`  
Figure 8 - Natural gas production and consumption in Egypt (U.S. EIA, 2014) 
3.6.3 Coal 
In 2013, Egypt consumed around 2.2 million tons of coal (BP, 2014). However, 
coal is  not used as an energy source but rather as a raw material for the coke and 
aluminum industries. However, due to the energy crisis, consecutive governments started 
from 2012 considering importing coal for utilization in the cement and power generation 
sectors. The main motivation was the low prices of coal when compared to importing 
natural gas or heavy fuel oil. By 2013, most of the cement plants in Egypt had already 
started taking serious steps towards fuel switching to coal after they had been having 
several natural gas cuts which sometimes lasted for many weeks. In April 2014, 
responding to huge pressure from the troubled cement industry, the cabinet officially 
approved using coal for the cement industry (Reuters, 2014). In December 2014, the 
Ministry of Electricity and Energy announced the intention of the Egyptian Electricity 
Holding Company (EEHC) to sign seven agreements with Chinese coal-power generation 
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companies (Mada Masr, 2014). It is evident that importing coal is one of the main pillars 
the government is considering for solving the energy crisis in Egypt. 
The main challenge to coal utilization in Egypt is the absence of the 
infrastructure. That includes ports, storage facilities and transportation. A number of ports 
are currently preparing to receive coal. Cement plants are also constructing storage 
facilities for the coal. This is of course in addition to the environmental impacts 
associated with its handling, transportation and combustion. Utilization of coal has 
sparked considerable public debate regarding the expected environmental impacts. A 
number of social movements were mobilized like “Egyptians against coal” in opposition 
of coal and supporting. The Ministry of Environment has already approved a number of 
cement plants switching to coal, in addition to a number of new coal operated power 
plants.   
3.6.4 Electricity 
Since 2010, Egypt has been facing electricity blackouts due to rising demand, 
declining natural gas production, poorly maintained infrastructure, and inadequate 
generation capacity. Egypt’s power generation capacity was 27 GW by the end of 2013, 
which is higher than the peak demand of 24 GW. In 2012, Egypt generated about 152 
billion kWh of electricity of which 70% came from natural gas, 20% from oil and 10% 
from renewables, mainly hydropower. Political and social unrest since the 2011 
revolution has slowed the governmental plans to expand power generation capacity by 30 
GW by 2020. Accordingly, the demand is rising at a rate much higher than capacity 
expansions (U.S. EIA, 2014).  
3.7 Egypt’s Food Challenges 
Although Egypt’s area is about 1 million km2, agricultural land is about 8 million 
feddans (Abdelhakam, 2005). Egypt is considered as an agricultural country where 
agriculture is a main component of the national economy. The agricultural sector 
employs around 31% of the labor force in Egypt (Kruseman & Vullings, 2007) and 
generates about 14% of the GDP (Morgan, 2010). Despite the positive impact the 
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agricultural sector has on food security and the economy, it faces serious challenges. 
Those challenges include land and water problems; outdated cultivation methods; lack of 
marketing knowledge by the farmers; poverty; degradation of natural resources; water 
and soil contamination; climate change; and inadequacy of policies for agricultural 
development (Shalaby et al., 2011).  
Egypt is a net food importer, importing more than half its wheat needs. Egypt’s 
foreign currency reserves reached US$ 15.43 billion by the end of January 2015 (CBE, 
2015), which covers three months of imports. This causes a supply risk. Inflation also 
causes considerable pressure on consumers as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has 
increased by an average of 9.23% within 2014 (CBE, 2015). This has been coupled with 
static income and an unemployment rate of 13.1% in the third quarter of 2014 
(CAPMAS, 2015). 
3.7.1 Food Availability 
 Food production in Egypt has had generally an upward trend over the last decade 
as shown in Figure 9. For example, wheat production has annually increased between 
2002 and 2011. However, in the longer term, Egypt is facing lots of challenges regarding 
food production. Those include an increasing population, limited agricultural land, small 
holder farming, degradation of land, construction on agricultural land, desertification and 
climate change (WFP, 2013). Between 2001 and 2010, cultivated land increased by 0.7% 
annually which is equal to 8% over the 10 years. However, after the revolution, the trend 
was reversed and cultivated land decreased by 1% between 2010 and 2011 (CAPMAS, 
2012). This was mainly due to illegal construction on agricultural land in Greater Cairo 
and the Nile Delta (Attia & Raslan, 2011). In addition to that, rural areas in Upper Egypt 
have suffered in the previous years from unpredictable weather leading to crop failure. 
This caused farmers to utilize the already stressed natural resources in an unsustainable 
manner (WFP, 2013).   
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Figure 9 – Production of Selected Crops in Egypt (million tons) (WFP, 2013) 
 While consecutive governments have promoted and worked for self-sufficiency, 
Egypt is far from being self-sufficient in terms of food production, particularly key 
serials. Table 5 shows Egypt’s Self Sufficiency of selected crops and the corresponding 
per capita consumption. Egypt is a net importer of food, which makes it vulnerable to 
both global food prices and exchange rates fluctuations (WFP, 2013).  
Table 5 - Self Sufficiency of selected crops and per capita consumption (WFP, 2013) 
Crops 
Self Sufficiency, % Per Capita Consumption (kg/year) 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Cereals 69.06 63.90 53.96 266.8 253.0 244.6 
Vegetable 104.70 106.46 106.11 164.3 122.5 135.9 
Wheat 53.15 47.86 42.60 135.4 133.9 135.0 
Fruit 111.14 111.11 116.70 93.1 89.7 83.8 
Maize 62.24 60.70 51.04 66.3 71.7 67.3 
Rice 112.49 116.21 98.25 65.2 39.6 35.4 
Meat 88.78 84.76 85.96 10.9 9.8 30.0 
Vegetable Oils 42.64 43.18 36.67 9.4 8.5 15.7 
Pulses 41.72 36.00 43.24 9.8 9.1 7.2 
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Crops 
Self Sufficiency, % Per Capita Consumption (kg/year) 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Sugar 100.03 100.01 100.01 9.1 7.7 7.2 
 
 Wheat is the key strategic crop in Egypt, as it is a major constituent of the 
Egyptian diet. Egypt’s average annual wheat consumption was around 18 million tons 
over the last five years. Out of that, Egypt imported 9-10 million tons annually. Although 
the wheat availability was not an issue in Egypt during the previous decades, there is 
considerable risk in its supply given the fall in the value of the Egyptian Pound against 
foreign currencies (WFP, 2013). The U.S. Dollar rose against the Egyptian Pound from 
6.15 EGP/USD in December 2012 to 8.88 EGP/USD in April 2016 (almost 45% 
increase) (XE, 2016). Egypt’s foreign currency reserves reached US$ 15.43 billion by the 
end of January 2015 (CBE, 2015). Wheat is mainly used for the production of the heavily 
subsidized baladi bread. The whole supply chain is full of losses, starting from poor 
storage of wheat to the leakage of subsidized flour through the black market (WFP, 
2013). 
3.7.2 Rising Food Insecurity 
 A number of events started from 2006 caused a decline in food security and 
resulted in the deterioration in the nutrition status impacting the most vulnerable 
households. The first event was the response to the avian influenza epidemic in 2006 
which involved a mass culling of poultry. This affected the livelihood and dietary 
diversity of the most vulnerable households. The second event was the food and fuel 
prices of 2007-2008 which increased the food crisis pushing more Egyptians into 
poverty. Even after the crisis the prices did not return back to normal. The third event was 
the rising of food prices in 2010 which was coupled with constant incomes as a result of 
the 2011 revolution (WFP, 2013). The revolution caused a decline in the economic 
performance of the country, causing the economic growth to slow down from an average 
of 6.2% in the period 2005-2010 to just 2.2% in 2011/2012 (Ministry of Finance , 2013).  
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 Data from the Household Income, Expenditure, and Consumption Survey 
(HIECS) shows that the most considerable shock noted by 74.7% of the households was 
the rise in food prices, as shown in Figure 10. The expenditure on food constitutes 40.6% 
of the average household income in Egypt, with the figure rising up to 51% for the most 
vulnerable households. This is an indication that households are significantly vulnerable 
to rising food prices (WFP, 2013). Prices of food and non-alcoholic beverage increased at 
a rate higher than the overall Consumer Price Index (CPI) during the period 2010-2012 
(CAPMAS, 2013). 
 
Figure 10 – Percentage of households citing shocks affecting their financial status after the revolution 
by region (WFP, 2013)  
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Chapter Four: Analysis of Virtual Water Trade in the Nile 
Basin and the Ethiopian Situation 
4.1 The Concept of Virtual Water 
Virtual water refers to the water consumed in the production of any commodity 
(Allan T. , 1997). When this commodity is traded, the embedded water in the product can 
be considered to be also traded. In that sense, international food trade may be considered 
as a massive pipeline. It is important though to differentiate between rain-fed agriculture 
(green water) and irrigated agriculture (blue water). Crops grown using irrigation are 
considered as a load on water resources in a given country, as this blue water could have 
been used for other activities. On the other hand, it is not possible to utilize the green 
water used in rain-fed agriculture for other purposes (Zeitoun et al., 2010).    
4.2 The Nile Basin 
River Nile runs through 11 countries in East Africa. The White Nile which 
originates from Burundi and the Blue Nile which originates from Ethiopia are the two 
main tributaries forming the Nile. The total area covered by the basin is 3,257,434 km2 
with the largest shares in Sudan (64%), Ethiopia (11%), Egypt (9%) and Uganda (7%); 
and smaller shares in Tanzania, Kenya, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea and South 
Sudan. Around 437 million people live in the Nile Basin countries, 57% of them in rural 
areas (Nile Basin Initiative, 2015). The total cultivated area in the basin is more than 26 
million ha, 84% of them rain-fed. Crops grown include sorghum, millet, maize, 
groundnut, and wheat. An important income generating activity is also livestock.  
The Nile basin countries face a number of challenges, the most serious of which 
are poverty, lack of food and water security, water pollution and land degradation. 
Further challenges include increased deforestation, soil erosion, lakes and reservoirs 
sedimentation, and loss of biodiversity (Sulser, et al., 2010). The hydrological and 
political borders of the Nile Basin are shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 – The Nile Basin Hydrological and Political Borders (LWRG, 2007) 
The Blue Nile River originates from Lake Tana in Northwest Ethiopia. It is then 
joined by a number of tributaries before it reaches Sudan. Rain is concentrated in the 
summer season as almost three quarters falls between the months of June and September 
(Conway, 2000). The Blue Nile continues flowing afterwards in Sudan towards the North 
West where it is joined by the Dinder-Rahad River through the Gezira and then it 
converges with the White Nile at Khartoum. The main Nile flows afterwards towards the 
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North where it is joined by Atbara River from the East. The Nile then enters Lake Nasser 
at the Sudanese Egyptian border which is created by the High Dam and flows afterwards 
towards the North till the Mediterranean Sea (Zhang et al., 2015). The Blue Nile together 
with River Atbara (which also originates in Ethiopia) contribute 84% of the water 
flowing to Lake Nasser in Egypt (Block & Strzepek, 2010). 
Water security has been previously defined in narrow terms based on water 
resources. When looking at the Nile Basin, the water present in the soil profiles in the 
basin is actually more than the water in the channels. In addition, the groundwater lying 
below the water channels has rarely been quantified. The volumes of water embedded in 
the international trade of crops and livestock is so large that it cannot be overlooked 
(Zeitoun et al., 2010). In terms of political economy, virtual water trade and water 
security have important implications on the Nile Basin states beyond the basin itself 
(Chapagain, 2006). For example, when a water scarce country imports crops and 
livestock, it depends on the international market to achieve food security and free it from 
its local scarcity conditions (Hoekstra & Hung, 2005). On the other hand, a country with 
a surplus of water resources may utilize virtual water trade to improve its relation with 
other countries thus improving its national security (Allan J. , 2003). 
 Green water, or soil water, is of particular importance when examining the Nile 
Basin. In general, most of the food produced globally is based on green water 
(Falkenmark & Rockstrom, 2006; Schiermeier, 2008). The Nile Basin countries 
collectively import around 39 bcm/year of crops, mostly soya bean and wheat from North 
and South America, in addition to 2 bcm of livestock, mostly cattle from Brazil, Australia 
and Ireland. The above-mentioned imports are based on green water from other basins. 
The major virtual water movements within the Nile Basin are also based on green water 
used to raise tea and coffee in Kenya and Uganda (Zeitoun et al., 2010). The estimated 
total amount of green water used in the Nile basin for the production of crops is about 
229 bcm/year, excluding the green water consumed by natural vegetation (FAO, 2006). 
On the other hand, the blue water used through irrigated agriculture is particularly 
significant for Egypt and Sudan. Around 90% of the freshwater use in the Nile river 
system is through irrigated farming (Appelgren et al., 2000). Significant amounts (around 
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0.25 bcm/year) are used though for growing citrus and vegetable exported to European 
markets (Zeitoun et al., 2010). The freshwater resources of the Nile are shown in Table 6. 
Due to the arid climate of the downstream riparians Egypt and Sudan, both countries are 
largely dependent on blue water from the Nile. Upstream riparians, on the other hand, 
receive lots of green water from rain and hence are less dependent on blue water from the 
Nile.   
Table 6 - Freshwater resources of the Nile (Zeitoun et al., 2010) 
 Average 
annual 
precipitation 
(mm) 
Nile River freshwater flows Soil water 
consumption (for 
agriculture) 
(BCM /y) 
Groundwater 
Production 
(BCM /y) 
Inflow 
(BCM/y) 
Outflow 
(BCM/y) 
DR Congo 1,245 0 1.5 31.9 421 
Burundi 1,110 0 1.5 6.1 2.1 
Rwanda 1,105 1.5 7 11 3.6 
Tanzania 1,015 7 10.7 31.6 30 
Kenya 1,260 0 8.4 20.4 3 
Uganda 1,140 28.7 37 45.8 29 
Eritrea 520 0 2.2 0.8 - 
Ethiopia 1,125 0 80.1 31.1 40 
Sudan 500 117.1 55.5 50.3 7 
Egypt 15 55.5  10 (to sea) 0 13 
Total in 
system 
 approx. 100 approx. 229  
 
4.2.1 Virtual Water Trade in the Nile Basin 
Virtual water trade within the Nile Basin countries is small when compared to 
virtual water trade arising from imports from outside the basin. As shown in Table 7, 
approximately 0.9 bcm/year of virtual water is traded annually with the Nile Basin, three 
quarters of which is based on green water. Egypt alone imports about 0.4 bcm/year out of 
the virtual water traded within the basin. On the other hand, the Nile Basin countries 
import around 39 bcm/year of virtual water in the form of crops, out of which Egypt 
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alone imports approximately 30 bcm/year, as shown in Table 8. The virtual water traded 
internally in the Nile Basin is only about 2.3% of the virtual water the basin imports from 
outside its borders. The basin exports around 11 bcm/year of virtual water to countries 
outside the basin, 90% of which is based on green water. Unless the Nile Basin countries 
take measures for better utilization of green water in the basin, the basin cannot achieve 
water and food self-sufficiency even if intra-basin trade is improved. There is currently a 
strong net virtual water trade deficit between the Nile Basin and the rest of the world 
amounting to about 28 bcm/year (Zeitoun et al., 2010). 
Table 7 - Imports’ within the Nile Basin, main trade items only, average values 1998–2004 (Zeitoun 
et al., 2010) 
Imports by Total VW 
trade (M m3) 
From Volume and 
major crop (M 
m3) 
Est. rain-fed 
Portion (M 
m3) 
Est. irrigated 
Portion (M 
m3) 
Egypt 372 Kenya 255 tea 240 15 
  Sudan 55 cotton 10 45 
   28.6 wheat 0 28.6 
   6.2 groundnut 4.5 1.7 
Kenya 197 Uganda 21 soya 21 0 
   12 maize 12 0 
   7.8 tobacco 7.8 0 
  Tanzania 21 maize 20 1 
   12 cotton 12 0 
   6.4 groundnut 6.4 0 
  Egypt 26 sugar 0 26 
   13 rice 0 13 
  Sudan 29 sugar 0 29 
Sudan 184 Kenya 87 tea 82 5 
   11 coffee 11 0 
  Uganda 78 coffee 78 0 
   Total 505 165 
 
Table 8 - Imports from the rest of the world, main trade items only, average values 1998–2004 
(Zeitoun et al., 2010) 
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Imports by Total VW 
trade (M m3) 
Specific VW 
‘trade’ (M 
m3) 
Crop Volume and 
origin  (M 
m3) 
Est. rain-
fed 
Portion (M 
m3) 
Est. 
irrigated 
Portion 
(M m3) 
Egypt 30,195 19,700 Soybean 8,512 
Argentina 
6,384 2,128 
    5,100 US 3,825 1,275 
    1,050 Brazil 788 1,012 
  5,213 Wheat 2,885 US 2855 0 
    755 Australia 755 0 
    592 France 592 0 
    357 Russia 357 0 
  3,400 Maize 2,653 US 1,990 663 
    439 Argentina 330 109 
    133 Brazil 100 33 
Sudan 3,565 2,523 Wheat 953 Australia 953 0 
    522 Canada 522 0 
    172 US 172 0 
Tanzania 1,818   Wheat, rice, 
maize 
1,454 364 
Kenya 1,817   Wheat, rubber, 
maize, rice 
1,454 363 
    Total 22,531 5,974 
 
There are strong discrepancies among the Nile Basin countries in terms of 
whether they are net importers or exporters of virtual water, as shown in Figure 12. Egypt 
and Sudan are clearly net importers of virtual water, while the Southern countries in 
addition to Ethiopia and Eritrea are net exporters. The virtual water traded annually 
within the basin cannot remedy the freshwater deficits the northern arid riparian countries 
suffer from. Most of the intra-basin trade is actually in the form of tea and coffee from 
Kenya and Tanzania to Sudan and Egypt (Zeitoun et al., 2010). The greater potential 
actually lies in the improvement of the productivity of rain-fed agriculture.   
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Figure 12 – Average annual total virtual water crop and livestock ‘trade’ between Nile Basin states 
and the rest of the world, imports and exports, 1998–2004 (Mm3/y) (Zeitoun et al., 2010) 
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4.3 Analysis of the Ethiopian Situation 
Ethiopia is one of the World’s Least Developing Countries (LDCs), though it has 
numerous resources including huge human resources. With a population of 96 million 
people in 2014 (CIA, 2015), Ethiopia produced a GDP of only 54.80 billion US dollars 
(Trading Economics, 2015). Egypt, on the other hand, with a population of 87 million 
people in 2014 (CIA, 2015) produced a GDP of 286.54 billion US dollars (Trading 
Economics, 2015).  Ethiopians have the right to hope for a better future through rapid 
economic development. This economic development can only be attained through 
boosting electricity generation capacity and thus using more energy in much needed 
economic activities. 
In the past, Egypt had power over the other Nile riparian countries through the 
1929 water treaty signed between Britain and Egypt. Britain, having control over many of 
the riparian countries, negotiated with Egypt on behalf of its colonies and gave Egypt the 
upper hand in the access and usage of the Nile water (Flintan & Tamarat, 2002). Several 
factors have later loosened the Egyptian grip on the Nile water. Those include 
independence of the riparian countries, high population growth, political developments, 
droughts and other natural disasters. These factors have recently forced Egypt to re-
negotiate water treaties in a direction that will likely decrease its control over the Nile 
(Ashton, 2002).On the other hand, water resources’ shortages in Ethiopia have pushed it 
to reconsider the Egyptian access to the Nile. Ethiopia’s growing population has caused 
its water demand to double in just a decade (Berman & Paul, 1999). The total reliance on 
the Nile water resources over centuries has resulted in the depletion of the Nile basin, 
which lead to unemployment, the spread of diseases and hunger. The resource depletion 
in the basin is the result of climate change, land use and land management (Goulden & 
Declan, 2009). 
Ethiopians, already living in poverty, are now also suffering from climate 
variability and extreme weather events (Oxfam, 2010). Development along the Nile has 
caused water pollution in riparian countries. For example, the Ethiopian Eritrean war in 
the late 1990s polluted the Nile basin with military and missile remnants (Kim & 
Kaluarachchi, 2009). This pollution was coupled with excessive population growth in the 
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Nile basin which is also increased by migrations to the basin (World Water Council, 
2006). Farming, one of the major sources of income in the basin, has been impacted by 
drought, famine and land degradation. Land degradation and deforestation have caused 
agriculture to be a very difficult task in many parts of the basin (EPA, 2010). 
Egypt, as a result of the 1929 mandate, has historically had absolute control over 
the Nile water resources. There was little conflict over the Nile water before the 1950s. 
However, due to declining water resources and population growth, riparian countries 
have grouped themselves up to access the Nile Water. These efforts were mainly lead by 
Kenya and Ethiopia (Rahman, 2012). For example, in 2010 Ethiopia announced a major 
hydro-electric project to supply the country’s electricity needs, which is currently under 
construction. The project was met by resentment by Egypt which attempted to veto any 
such project (Cascão, 2011).  
4.3.1 Energy Security 
Ethiopia is categorized by the United Nations as one of the Least Developed 
Countries in the World (UN, 2015). Having an average annual income of US$ 120 per 
capita, 40% of Ethiopians live below the poverty line (UNDP, 2015). The population 
growth has been exceptional, with the population rising from 66 to 96 million between 
the years 2000 and 2014. By 2020, it is expected to reach 110 million (UN, 2013). 
Biomass is the main source of energy for the Ethiopian population with a share of 93.2% 
of total energy consumption (IEA, 2012). Only 26% of the Ethiopian population has 
access to electricity, while the average electricity consumption per capita is 52 kWh per 
capita (compared to 100.0% and 1,743 kWh per capita for Egypt). The electricity 
installed capacity in Ethiopia was 2060 MW in 2010, which covers only 10% of the 
national demand (WB, 2015).  
4.3.2 Food Security 
Food security is a big challenge in Ethiopia. Land degradation and seasonality of 
rainfall are serious factors influencing achieving food security in Ethiopian highlands 
(FAO, 2011). Inappropriate land use practices coupled with rainfall seasonality have 
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caused land degradation. About 82% of the annual rainfall occurs in just 3-4 months 
causing erosive runoff (Conway, 2000). Practicing farming on steep slopes together with 
the seasonal rainfall has increased soil erosion (Haileet al., 2001). Consequently, decades 
of consecutive soil degradation have worsened the seasonality of the water availability 
necessary for food production and reduced soil fertility necessary for the agricultural 
activities needed for the livelihood of a big and rapidly growing population (Zeleke & 
Hurni, 2001). Rain variability has been affecting agricultural yield for several decades in 
Ethiopia (Bewket, 2009). 
Based on a 2014 WFP report, more than 30% of Ethiopia’s population is below the 
food poverty line. This portion of the population is unable to secure the minimum 
calorific intake required for having a healthy diet. Chronic malnutrition is a serious 
challenge in Ethiopia, as 44% of children below five are stunted and 10% affected by 
acute malnutrition. Regarding diet quality, half of the population sourced most of their 
calorific intake (more than 75%) from starchy staples, i.e. their diet is highly unvaried. 
30% of households used three or fewer of the seven food groups over a continuous week. 
In terms of diet adequacy, one out of four households consumed unacceptable diets based 
on the food consumption score. Out of these 10% had poor food consumption and 17% 
had borderline food consumption (WFP, 2014). 
Several other indicators show the severity of the food insecurity problem in Ethiopia. 
Almost half of the household expenditures were on food. 35% of the households reported 
to have gone through at least one shock in the past year, including food price increases 
and food shortages. Rainfall is the single most important determinant for food production 
in Ethiopia. Most of the households in Ethiopia reported lack of rainfall as the major 
cause of their vulnerability. In general rainfall has declined between the months of March 
and September from 1980 to present (WFP, 2014). 
4.3.3 Water Security 
Ethiopia is characterized by having huge discrepancy between its abundant water 
resources and the widespread water scarcity and drought among its population. The 
country has suffered from decades of extensive water pollution and rapid population 
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increase. Although Ethiopia enjoys large quantities of renewable water resources, it has a 
very low capacity of water storage. In general, water withdrawals come from water 
storage. Therefore, poor storage is associated with low withdrawals. The seasonality and 
variability of rainfall has increased the incidence of floods and droughts. Due to the poor 
storage, Ethiopia’s abundant water resources are available only during few months of the 
year (Kloos & Legesse, 2010).  
In the Ethiopian rural areas, women and children might have to walk up to six hours 
to bring water. Most of the water is collected from shallow ponds shared with animals. 
People may also get water from shallow wells. Those are sources are heavily subjected to 
contamination as rainwater runoff collects contaminants from surrounding areas pouring 
them into the source. In Ethiopia, 49 million people lack access to safe water, while 76 
million lack sanitation services (water.org, 2015).    
4.3.4 Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam 
Ethiopia has significant water resources, providing it with an estimated hydro 
power potential of 45,000 MW (Salman, 2013). Such hydropower capacity can drive the 
Ethiopian economic growth in the coming years as it presents a reliable and cheap 
electricity source (Verhoeven, 2011). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is 
a mega hydro-electric project currently being constructed on the Blue Nile. Its location is 
close to the Sudanese border as shown in Figure 13. It is planned to have a 74 BCM 
capacity reservoir and a power generation capacity of 6,000MW. Construction started in 
2011 and it is expected to be inaugurated in 2017 (Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, 
2013).  
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Figure 13 - Nile basin showing the expected GERD (Zhang at el., 2015) 
The main concern of Egypt regarding the GERD is the access to the Nile water 
which is its primary water source (Swain A. , 2011). In order to assess the dam impacts 
on downstream countries, an international 10-person committee was formed and it 
submitted its conclusions in May 2013. The studies are not public but it has been reported 
that the Egyptian President has commented on the current studies that they are not 
adequate (Reuters, 2013). On the other hand, Sudan has shown support to the project in 
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order to get access to affordable power and reduce silt and sediment downstream. This 
would lead to a significant reduction in the cost of removing mud in the Jazeeera Scheme 
due to the dam blocking of silt and sediments (MoFA, 2012).  
The GERD will undoubtedly become an important resource for energy 
production, food production and economic development in Ethiopia. It has also become a 
political statement by the Ethiopian government that they are no longer bound to the 
previous colonial water agreements. The GERD has become a symbol Ethiopian 
nationalism and their foreseen “renaissance”. This can be seen evident from the way the 
dam is being financed: 30% from China (The Economist, 2011) and the rest from the 
Ethiopian government through local and international bonds and donations (Water 
Technology.net, 2014).    
In order to understand the impact of filling the GERD reservoir on the flow of 
water to Egypt, a hydrology-hydropower modeling study was conducted by Zhang et al 
(2015). Although there is no publicly announced filling policy for the reservoir, the study 
revealed that the reservoir filling will cause a reduction in the stream flow at the Jazeeera 
Scheme and Lake Nasser. The reduction extent varies significantly according to the 
filling policy, climate variability and climate change during the filling period. The study 
concluded that whether the reservoir is filled through a policy agreed with downstream 
riparian countries or through a one-sided policy dictated by Ethiopia will largely affect 
the impact on the water reaching Lake Nasser. 
Another study was conducted to assess the GERD filling and operation effect on 
Aswan High Dam. Its conclusions were as follows (Mulat & Moges, 2014): 
 The 6 years filling period of the GERD will not cause impact to the Aswan High Dam 
water availability. 
 Power generation from Aswan High Dam will decrease by 12% during filling and 7% 
during the dam operation.  
 Evaporative water losses from Aswan High Dam and GERD reservoirs will decrease 
by 16% due to the Aswan High Dam operating at reduced water level. 
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 Aswan High Dam will operate at 96% reliability level in terms of performance 
efficiency. 
El Bastawesy et al. (2015) studied the effect of the GERD using different 
hydrological scenarios with the purpose of estimating the dam impact on the downstream 
discharge. Their analysis stressed on the fact that the effect of the GERD on the 
downstream discharge might be signifant if the GERD reservoir gets filled in low-flood 
seasons over a short duration.  They strongly recommended to reach an agreement 
regarding storage capacities of all the dams on the Nile to satisfy the populations’ water 
requirements. 
Ramadan et al. (2013) used a hydrological model (MODSIM) developing different 
operational scenarios in order to study the impacts of GERD construction on the Egyptian 
water resources. Their results showed that the negative impacts are more likely to occur. 
They concludde that the GERD impounding at the normal flow scenario through 2, 3 and 
6 years would reduce the water reaching Lake Nasser by around 37, 25 and 13 BCM per 
year respectively. This would cause a significant negative impact on Egypt’s water 
resources. 
In addition to the GERD, Ethiopia has plans to build on its huge hydropower 
capacity. The Ministry of Water and Energy listed the hydropower projects to be 
implemented. 
Table 9 – Potential hydropower projects in Ethiopia (Derbew, 2013) 
 Name of the project Installed capacity (MW) 
 
Status 
 
1 Tekeze II 450 Under feasibility study 
2 Derbu I & II 250 + 325 Feasibility study completed 
3 Geba I & II 366 Feasibility study completed 
4 Gojeb 153 Feasibility study completed 
5 Genale V 100 Reconnaissance 
6 Beko Abo 1,700 Under feasibility study 
7 Baro I & II and Genji 900 Feasibility study completed 
8 Mendeya (Blue Nile) 2,000 Under feasibility study 
9 Tams 1,060 Reconnaissance 
10 Dabus 425 Reconnaissance 
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11 Birbir R 467 Reconnaissance 
12 Gibe V 660 Under feasibility study 
13 Gibe IV 1,400 Under feasibility study 
14 Lower Didessa 613 Reconnaissance 
15 Wabishebele 18 87 Feasibility study completed 
 Total 10,956  
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Chapter Five: Proposed Policy Framework for the WEF Nexus 
in Egypt and the Nile Basin Countries 
Since ancient history, the Nile River has been a key resource for socioeconomic 
activities for the communities that live along it. However, the water flowing in the River 
is a finite resource. The 1929 water agreement between Britain and Egypt was more like 
an order imposed by a colonial power in favor of its own interests. The 1959 water 
agreement was similar, as it was an agreement between Egypt and Sudan which deprived 
the other countries from utilization the Nile water (Kindleberger, 1986). The first 
disturbance of the Nile regime was in 1988 after the second Ethiopian famine. At that 
time, Ethiopia committed itself to providing more hydroelectricity and water for its 
people. Ethiopia announced launching Tana-Beles Project which would take water from 
Lake Tana (the main source of Blue Nile) to the Beles River which would transport it to 
200,000 farmers in new settlements. In 1990, Egypt succeeded to block the financing 
from the African Development Bank to the project (Lemma, 2001). 
Egypt has recently been attempting to work on the growing consensus towards 
forming a new Nile Basin regime. The water in the Nile River does not have equal 
importance to all the riparian countries, as some of them receive adequate rainfall for 
agriculture. However, due to the foreseen change in economic conditions in upstream 
countries, Egypt has recognized that reaching a current deal might be better than reaching 
a deal in the future. As a result, Egypt is changing its water policy and pushing towards 
basin-wide cooperation (Tesfaye, 2014). While decreasing its claims on historic rights in 
the Nile water, Egypt however continued changing the actual situation on the ground; 
constructing massive new water projects unilaterally within its borders, with continued 
dependence on the Nile Water (Swain A. , 2002).  
Historically, Egypt succeeded in building viable relations with some of the key 
upstream countries. Egypt has worked with Uganda in several projects for many years. 
Those include the Owens Dam and clearing Lakes Victoria. Egypt also enjoyed good 
relations with Kenya through the cooperation in developing ways to increase Kenya’s 
dependence on ground water. In addition, Egypt helped Tanzania plan and develop a 
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water research center (Tesfaye, 2014). However, Egypt’s relation with Ethiopia, from 
which 86% of the Nile water originates, was not as good. Egypt has managed to block a 
number of multilateral institutions’ funds to develop Ethiopia’s water resources. This is 
because multilateral institutions require the consent of downstream riparian countries to 
finance project on trans-boundary rivers (Lemma, 2001). In fact, there has been a 
historical nationalistic rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile. However, there 
are also historical and cultural elements to build on like for example the relationship 
between the Coptic Church and the Orthodox Ethiopian Church (Rubenson, 2009). 
Although all Nile Basin countries are important forces in reaching a new Nile Basin 
agreement, satisfying both Egypt and Ethiopia remains the most challenging task 
(Tesfaye, 2014). 
Throughout the negotiations in the previous decades, Egypt has so far negotiated 
based on historical rights in the Nile water. The GERD has been under construction since 
2011 and is expected to be operational in 2017. Although Ethiopia repeatedly announced 
that the aim of the GERD is only to generate electricity and that it will not be used to 
withhold the Nile water, there are serious doubts regarding this announcement. With a 
population of 96 million people in 2014 (CIA, 2015), Ethiopia has to achieve water, food 
and energy security. Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the World. The GERD is 
their national mega project which is supposed to boost their economy and turn the 
country around as suggested by its name. The Egyptian Ethiopian relations have suffered 
since Ethiopia announced the construction of the GERD in 2010.  
The reason why the negotiations so far not been successful is that they were 
mostly win-lose negotiations: whatever water Ethiopia wins Egypt has to lose. Integrated 
Water Resources Management (IWRM) has been thought to be the solution to the crisis 
during the previous decade. However, this idea has been refuted repeatedly for trans-
boundary rivers (Biswas, 2010). The main disadvantage of IWRM is the fact that it 
tackles water policy as if it is a commodity while ignoring the crucial human and social 
issues. Water disputes are more complicated than disputes over commodities; they are 
closely tied to the pursuit of justice and fairness (Anand, 2007).  
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Although the Nile Basin countries are net importers of virtual water, there is a 
huge potential to improve the overall situation if a policy framework is created for the 
WEF nexus and the basin is thought of as one unit. Cooperation within the basin can help 
upstream countries improve the yield they get from green water through using the 
Egyptian expertise in agriculture. If we also add electricity generation and distribution to 
the equation, synergy is even improved. Having populations with very low electricity 
access percentages in the upstream countries opens for the possibility of harnessing more 
hydropower and utilizing the Egyptian expertise in electricity transmission and 
distribution. In return, through the integration of electricity grids, Egypt can get cheap 
and clean hydropower. In fact, the GERD itself can be viewed as an opportunity if the 
right formula is introduced between the countries. The project will produce a 
considerable amount of clean electricity and at the same time store water at climatic 
conditions causing much less evaporation than that occurring at the High Dam. 
In this section, a policy framework will be developed for the WEF nexus. The 
policy framework will not only tackle the Nile Basin, but will also attempt to develop the 
WEF nexus for Egypt. It will be demonstrated how mega projects in Egypt like the 1.5 
million feddans reclamation program and the expansion of the power generation sector 
have the potential of benefitting from the WEF synergy. 
5.1 Policies Framework within the Egyptian Context  
In Egypt, the policies related to the water, energy and food sectors are incoherent and 
uncoordinated.  As shown in Table 10, the three sectors are planned independently. Even 
the years determined for the implementation of the policies are different.  
Table 10 – Policies of the water, energy and food sectors in Egypt (Trinex, 2015) 
National Water Resources 
Strategy (2009-2017) 
National Energy Strategy 
(2008-2020) 
National Agricultural 
Development Strategy 
(2001-2017) 
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 Development of national 
water resources 
 Protection of national 
water resources 
 Efficient utilization of 
national water resources 
 Securing the supply of 
electrical energy 
 Minimizing electricity 
prices 
 Expanding utilization of 
renewable energy sources 
 Environment protection 
and climate change 
limiting 
 Restructuring electricity 
sector and developing 
operations and manpower 
 Sustainable use of 
agricultural natural 
resources 
 Improving agricultural 
productivity 
 Increasing competitiveness 
of the agricultural products 
in local and foreign 
markets 
 Achieving higher rates of 
food security in strategic 
goods 
 Improving opportunities 
for agricultural investment 
 
 Such uncoordinated policies prevent Egypt from harnessing the synergies among the 
three sectors. There is a need to develop one integrated strategic plan for the WEF nexus, 
according to which the three sector policies will be aligned. The WEF nexus strategic 
plan will come up with integrated and sectoral projects prioritized in coordination with 
national development priorities. Examples will be presented later in this chapter to 
demonstrate how Egypt can benefit from having coordinated WEF nexus policies.   
5.2 Institutional Framework and Methodology for WEF Nexus in Egypt 
and the Nile Basin Countries 
Egypt has a Supreme Energy Council which is headed by the Prime Minister and 
includes the Ministers of Electricity, Petroleum, Finance, Defense, Tourism, Transport, 
Industry and Trade, Investment, Planning, International Cooperation, Environment and 
Housing (Alfajr, 2014). It is recommended that the Supreme Council for Energy be 
expanded to be the Supreme Council for Water, Energy and Food, through the 
introduction of the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The mandate of the Supreme Council of WEF should include coordination 
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between all the governmental agencies for Water, Energy and Food, including alignment 
of policies and plans, exchange of information, review of projects and programs in each 
sector, and the monitoring of implementation and operation of these projects and 
programs. 
A Similar institutional framework should be developed for the Nile Basin Countries. 
This can take the form of a Nile Basin WEF Council, which can be formed of the Prime 
Ministers and the Ministers of water resources, agriculture and energy in the Nile Basin 
Countries. The Council should take strategic decisions and approve projects and plans, 
and should have a number of technical committees for each sector and for policies, 
planning and project monitoring and evaluation. In addition, the decisions taken by the 
proposed Nile Basin Council should be legally binding to all the Nile Basin countries. 
The purpose of having its decisions legally binding is to avoid the situation of the Nile 
Basin Initiative which has been operational since 1999 but has had minimum 
achievements since then. 
The aim of the institutional framework developed is to coordinate sectoral and 
integrated policies, develop strategic plans and prioritize, monitor and evaluate projects 
that take into consideration the WEF nexus. The idea is to get decision makers to think 
about projects in a holistic manner instead of thinking about them in a single dimensional 
manner. The framework is designed to be developed in a highly participative manner so 
that the different decision makers take ownership of the developed policies, strategic 
plans and selected projects. The operational methodology of how the framework works is 
shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14 – Operational Methodology for WEF Nexus at Egypt and/or Nile Basin Level 
  
Develop the institutional setup  
Develop the policy and strategic 
planning framework through 
stakeholders’ consultation 
Review & assess existing and 
planned projects and programs 
Selection of WEF projects and 
programs 
Monitoring & evaluation of 
implemented projects and 
programs 
Develop criteria for selection of 
new projects/programmes based 
on digital logic weighting 
 
National and regional 
stakeholders’ consultation at the 
projects and programs final 
approval stage 
No 
Seeking financing for projects 
and programs 
Identify 
policy gaps 
Policy draft by 
stakeholders 
Policy draft 
approval 
Assigning scores for 
projects/programmes based on 
scoring matrix 
Yes 
Score passed 
Score failed 
Abandon 
project/programme 
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The development of the policy framework shall follow a participatory approach 
involving the different stakeholders during the stage of developing the policy and 
strategic planning framework. Although the process will be led by governmental entities, 
it is very important to realize that the success of the policy framework also depends on 
some key players. Those include other governmental entities, private sector, NGOs, 
academic institutions and the public. It is of utmost importance to involve all the relevant 
players early on in the planning process. Events targeting specific stakeholders and public 
hearing sessions shall be organized. Consultation with relevant international 
organizations is very important as well. It helps to develop global support for the 
proposed policies, projects and programs, which is expected to be reflected in the 
willingness of international and regional financial institutions to support these projects. 
The purpose of the stakeholders’ consultation at the policy and strategic planning 
framework stage is to gather as much input as possible from the different stakeholders at 
a very early stage to feed into the process of projects and programs prioritization. In order 
to ensure a sound stakeholders’ consultation process, participatory workshops will be 
held to ensure gathering input from grass root population into the strategic planning 
process. In order to do that, one national workshop and eight regional workshops will be 
conducted. In addition to receiving input from the stakeholders, the purpose of the 
workshops is also to raise awareness of the public about the cooperation mechanism and 
the topic of the WEF nexus in general. During the process, policy gaps will be identified 
and policy draft will be developed by stakeholders. The policy drafts will have to be 
approved by the government, otherwise they should be returned back for more 
stakeholders’ consultation.   
In order to make sure the policy planning framework does not result in duplication of 
effort, all relevant existing and planned projects and initiatives relevant to the WEF nexus 
will be assessed and evaluated. It is very important to align the selection process of 
projects and programs with the local national priorities of each country in order to 
guarantee the maximum level of support from the government.  
The methodology selected for the selection of projects and programs under the 
cooperation mechanism is the digital logic method. In order to adequately allocate a 
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weight for every criterion, proper assessment of all criteria concerning their significance 
with respect to objectives must be done. The allocation must also take into consideration 
the importance of each objective with respect to the other. In case weight allocation is 
done arbitrarily, it would lead to inaccuracies of decision due to having a large number of 
criteria. 
The digital logic method is adapted for the process of selection in order to allocate 
calculated weights for each criterion. The digital logic method has the advantage of 
simplifying a complex decision by breaking it apart into smaller and simple logic 
decisions of yes or no outcomes.  The process bases its technique on comparing every 
criterion with the other and deciding which is more important with a yes or no. In this 
case the number of criteria is 8, and when comparing each with the other, the number of 
logical decisions that need to be made is  
𝑛(𝑛−1)
2
 which computes to 28. The yes or no 
decision is numerically translated to 1 and 0. For each criterion, a row of 1 or 0 decisions 
is formed where each row must have 7 values as per number of comparisons made with 
respect to the other criteria. The values of 1 and 0 are summed up for each criterion and 
divided by the total number of decisions (28) to allocate the weight. The process is 
demonstrated in Table 11. 
In order to identify the best projects/programmes for implementation, they should be 
evaluated under pre-defined criteria. The criteria are based have the most significant 
impact on water, energy and food security, in addition to other important factors like 
alignment with national policies, relevance to climate change, environmental impacts and 
sustainability of the projects. Sub-criteria have also been developed for each criterion. 
The sub-criteria under each criterion are given equal weight. The criteria and sub-criteria 
and that are used are discussed below. 
1. Relevance to water security 
a. Sustainability of the water resource 
b. Quantity of water needed/produced 
2. Relevance to energy security 
a. Energy resources availability 
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b. Electricity access to populations 
c. Availability of affordable energy to populations 
3. Relevance to food security 
a. Impact on food availability 
b. Ability of most vulnerable households to withstand food prices shocks 
4. Relevance to climate change 
a. Relevance to climate change mitigation 
b. Relevance to climate change adaptation 
5. Sustainability of the project 
a. Whether a feasibility study has been completed 
b. Availability of management capacity 
c. Availability of maintenance capacity 
6. Alignment with other national policies & development priorities including poverty 
reduction and other social objectives 
a. Relevance to national policy framework/strategies/plans 
b. Alignment with poverty reduction policies 
c. Alignment with social justice and social inclusion   
7. Cost effectiveness & economic viability 
a. Availability of budget for implementing the project 
b. Economic indicators for the project 
8. Environmental Impacts 
a. Whether the project has an approved environmental impact assessment / 
strategic environmental assessment study 
b. Impacts on air quality 
c. Impacts on water quality 
d. Impacts on soil 
The evaluation criteria presented will have the following benefits: 
 Facilitate the selection of projects that will meet each country’s most urgent and 
immediate needs 
 Prioritize projects which have a high ranking on the WEF nexus 
68 
 Blend with national plans and policies 
 Take into consideration all pillars of sustainable development  
 Table 11 – Digital Logic Weighting 
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Relevance to 
water security 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1                      5 17.9% 
Relevance to 
energy security 
0       0 1 0 0 1 1                3 10.7% 
Relevance to 
food security 
 1      1      1 0 1 1 1           6 21.4% 
Relevance to 
climate change 
  0      0     0     1 0 0 0       1 3.6% 
Sustainability 
of the project  
   1      1     1    0    1 1 0    5 17.9% 
Alignment with 
national 
policies 
    0      1     0    1   0   0 1  3 10.7% 
Economic 
Viability 
     0      0     0    1   0  1  1 3 10.7% 
Environmental 
Impacts 
      0      0     0    1   1  0 0 2 7.1% 
Total                              100% 
The weights obtained from the digital logic weighting will be further divided into equal 
weight sub-criteria to have the matrix ready for projects/programmes evaluation. The full 
matrix is presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 –Matrix for Projects/Programmes Evaluation including sub-criteria 
Criteria Criteria Weight Sub-Criteria Sub-Criteria Weight 
Relevance to water 
security 
17.9% Sustainability of the water 
resource 
8.95% 
Quantity of water 
needed/produced 
8.95% 
Relevance to energy 
security 
10.7% Energy resources availability 3.57% 
Electricity access to 
populations 
3.57% 
Availability of affordable 
energy to populations 
3.57% 
Relevance to food 
security 
21.4% Impact on food availability 10.71% 
Ability of most vulnerable 
households to withstand food 
prices shocks 
10.71% 
Relevance to climate 
change 
3.6% Relevance to climate change 
mitigation 
1.79% 
Relevance to climate change 
adaptation 
1.79% 
Sustainability of the 
project  
17.9% Whether a feasibility study 
has been completed 
5.95% 
Availability of management 
capacity 
5.95% 
Availability of maintenance 
capacity 
5.95% 
Alignment with 
national policies 
10.7% Relevance to national policy 
framework/strategies/plans 
3.57% 
Alignment with poverty 
reduction policies 
3.57% 
Alignment with social justice 
and social inclusion   
3.57% 
Economic Viability 10.7% Availability of budget for 
implementing the project 
5.36% 
Economic indicators for the 
project 
5.36% 
Environmental 
Impacts 
7.1% Whether the project has an 
approved environmental 
impact assessment / strategic 
environmental assessment 
study 
1.79% 
Impacts on air quality 1.79% 
Impacts on water quality 1.79% 
Impacts on soil 1.79% 
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Criteria Criteria Weight Sub-Criteria Sub-Criteria Weight 
Total   100.00% 
 
At this stage, the projects and programs prioritization process has reached some 
results which should be presented to the different stakeholders and the public. Similar to 
the public consultation process conducted at the strategic planning stage, one national 
workshop and eight regional workshops will be conducted at the final approval stage. The 
results reached will be presented and input will be received again from the stakeholders 
regarding the results. All comments and concerns will be recorded and used as an input to 
the projects and programs prioritization process.  
Once the stakeholders’ consultation process is completed and input received, the 
prioritized list of projects and programs is ready to be finalized. The final list will be 
completed by the project team in anticipation of securing the necessary funds.  
The ultimate goal of the policy framework is to implement projects and programs 
that prioritize the WEF nexus and at the same time contribute to the national priorities of 
each of the Nile Basin countries. In order to do so, it is necessary to secure the necessary 
funds. It is proposed to create a fund or development bank for the Nile Basin countries. 
The fund will be financed by the Nile Basin countries with returns going back also to the 
funding countries. 
5.3 Examples of projects and programs that could benefit from WEF 
synergy in Egypt 
5.3.1 The Reclamation of 1.5 Million Feddans Project 
In November 2014, President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sissy announced the launch of a 
project for the reclamation of 1 million feddans at 11 areas at the Western Desert. The 
project was scheduled to be completed in 10 months as per the Ministry of Agriculture 
which was responsible for the file at that time (Youm7, 2014). This is exactly the type of 
project which needs the WEF nexus to ensure its success. There is no possible way the 
Ministry of Agriculture can handle this project without very close coordination with the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation and the Ministry of Electricity and 
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Renewable Energy. For that reason, the project was delayed significantly. In May 2015, it 
seems that the project ownership was shifted to the General Organization for Physical 
Planning at the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development. This was 
concluded from the media reporting that a Memorandum of Understanding had been 
signed between the Ministry of Housing and a Chinese company to fund the 
infrastructure required for the land reclamation and the development of the new urban 
communities within the 1 million feddans project (Daily News Egypt, 2015). In October 
2015, a source at the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation announced that the 
project was assigned to it and that the Ministry of Agriculture will only play a 
consultative role only. The decision was attributed to the Prime Minister (Reda, 2015). It 
was later announced that the project has been expanded to cover 1.5 million feddans.   
The key success factors in a project like the reclamation of 1.5 million feddans are 
availing both the water resources and energy needed for the project. In December 2015, 
the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation announced that the project will depend 
88.5% on ground water through 5114 wells and 11.5% on Nile water. It also announced 
that the technical studies have confirmed that the sustainability of the ground water for 
the first and second phases of the project has been confirmed for 100 years and that the 
studies are in progress for the third phase (Al-Wafd, 2015).     
Although it is considered a positive step that the management of the project has been 
transferred to the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, the project still needs the 
WEF nexus approach. Had it been implemented from the beginning of the project, it 
would have saved lots of time and effort. The project has now passed the planning stage 
for availing the water resources, but still has several missing links. No details were 
announced to the public regarding the plan to desalinate the ground water given the fact 
that the ground water in Egypt is brackish with salinities ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 
mg/l (Nasr & Sewilam, 2015). Apart from the normal regular energy requirements for 
primary production; drying, cooling and storage; and crops transportation, desalination is 
an energy intensive process and hence requires the intervention of the Ministry of 
Electricity and Renewable Energy. For that reason, it is expected that a nexus approach, 
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if implemented, would guarantee the adequate intervention from all the required 
stakeholders.   
5.3.2 Expanding the Power Generation Sector 
During the past year, Egypt has been working on expanding its power generation 
sector. During the 2015 Egypt’s Investment Conference, Egypt’s Electricity Minister 
signed MOUs worth USD 22 billion for power generation projects. Those included coal, 
natural gas, solar and wind projects (Atlantic Council, 2015). In addition, Egypt has plans 
to build a nuclear power plant at El Dabaa. In 2015, Egypt and Russia signed a deal to 
build the nuclear power plant with 4 reactors each producing 1,200 MW (EIA, 2015).  
While expanding the power generation sector, it is clear that the government did not 
have the water scarcity problem into consideration. Combined power generation and 
desalination plants can highly improve the overall efficiency of the process. A study 
made on Al-Zour gas turbine power plant in Kuwait showed that the introduction of a 
desalination unit improved the overall thermal efficiency of the process by 25% (Alsairafi 
et al., 2013). In the Arabian Gulf countries, combined power generation and desalination 
is very common. This is made institutionally possible by the fact that one Ministry in 
responsible for the production of both power and water. This is another example of lost 
opportunities due to the absence of the WEF nexus approach in Egypt. 
5.4 Examples of projects and programs that can benefit from WEF 
synergy on the Nile Basin Level 
5.4.1 Expanding Green Water Utilization in the Basin 
Groundwater is widely used for domestic use in the Nile Basin. It is the main source 
for drinking water for rural communities in the basin. Around 70% of the population in 
Ethiopian Highlands and the Nile Equatorial Plateau depend on groundwater. Thus 
percentage reaches 80% in Sudan, almost 100% in South Sudan, but only 13% in Egypt. 
Groundwater is also widely used for agricultural purposes in the Northern parts of the 
basin (Sudan and Egypt) (Nile Basin Initiative, 2012). Its use is limited in the Southern 
parts due to the abundance of rainfall as well as the availability of surface water bodies. 
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In general, groundwater is underutilized in the basin as shown in Table 13. Although the 
groundwater quality in the Nile Basin is highly variable, the groundwater across the 
region in general is fresh and suitable for human consumption in terms of physical and 
chemical parameters. The main exception is the Nile Delta area in northern Egypt where 
the groundwater is highly saline due to the intrusion of salt water from the sea (Nile 
Basin Initiative, 2012).  
Table 13 – Groundwater Potential of Nile Basin Countries (Hassan et al., 2004) 
Country Groundwater 
(BCM/year) 
Renewable 
groundwater 
(BCM/year) 
Non-renewable 
groundwater 
(BCM/year) 
Groundwater 
annual 
extraction 
(BCM /year) 
Burundi 0.40  0.18 0.22 0.03 
D R Congo 51.9  46.75 5.15 0.21 
Egypt  4.00  0.09 3.91 0.90 
Ethiopia 7.23  5.50 1.73 0.40 
Kenya 2.34 1.01 1.33 0.42 
Rwanda 0.40 0.32 0.09 0.04 
Sudan 6.40 1.75 4.65 0.50 
Tanzania 5.23 4.00 1.23 0.38 
Uganda 2.12 1.95 0.17 0.18 
 Nile Basin countries have the potential for increasing the rain fed areas. Figure 15 
shows the expected increase in harvested areas rain fed in the Nile Basin countries in 
2030 and 2050. 
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 Figure 15 – Harvested rain fed areas in the Nile Basin countries including projections – developed 
from (FAO, 2011) 
5.4.1.1 Using water footprint comparative advantage to grow crops using the least 
possible water 
As a smart choice, it is recommended to grow crops at the areas which have the 
lowest water footprint for that specific crop. Based on that, the following opportunities 
exist: 
 The Nile Basin countries are collectively net importers of cereals. Increasing the 
production of cereals is an important target for these countries to improve their 
food security situation. In that sense there are huge opportunities to improve the 
yield of rain-fed cereals including maize in Ethiopia and Uganda as well as wheat 
in Tanzania and DR Congo. This can be done without using any additional blue 
water. 
 All Nile Basin countries are net importers of rice (Nile Basin Initiative, 2012). 
The water footprint of rice in Egypt is much lower than upstream countries due to 
the much higher yield in Egypt. If Egypt gets more cereals intake from upstream 
Nile Basin countries, there is an opportunity. 
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 Although Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda are the biggest producers of 
bananas in the basin, they have the lowest yields (Nile Basin Initiative, 2012). 
This presents an opportunity for improving the yield in upstream countries and 
helping them export to Egypt. 
 Egypt has the lowest yield among the Nile Basin countries in the production of 
mangoes, even though it is the largest producer. On the other hand, huge amounts 
are wasted in South Sudan and Uganda due to inadequate infrastructure required 
for transportation and storage (Nile Basin Initiative, 2012). Egypt can help these 2 
countries with improving infrastructure and thus can import from them and 
decrease its production.  
 Except for Kenya, Rwanda and Sudan, all the other Nile Basin countries have a 
relatively low water footprint for production of sugar cane (Nile Basin Initiative, 
2012). This highlights the opportunity for expanding production and exporting. 
5.4.1.2 Using Egyptian expertise to improve the yield of upstream countries 
The productivity of rain fed agriculture is poor in the Nile Basin. The productivity 
is limited by poor soil, water and bad crop management. There is room for improvement 
of agriculture based in green water in the Nile Basin. Farmers are unable to use the 
optimal quantities and quantity of fertilizers. They also do not use improved seeds. A 
study conducted on maize in the Ethiopian part of the Blue Nile showed that the grain 
yield of maize increased by an average of 51% with near optimal and non-limiting soil 
fertility conditions. The study concluded that enhancing soil fertility coupled with the 
usage of high yield crop varieties have the potential of improving overall productivity 
through the reduction of evaporation and the increase of transpiration (Erkossa et al., 
2011). Compared to Egypt, the Nile Basin countries has very low crop yields. Figure 16 
shows comparative yields for selected food crops in Egypt compared to the rest of the 
Nile Basin countries. The yield in upstream countries is between 15 to 50% of the yield 
in Egypt. The figure shows the huge potential for improving yield at the Nile Basin 
countries if only the Egyptian expertise is utilized (Nile Basin Initiative, 2012).  
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Figure 16 – Comparative yields for selected food crops 2005-2009 (Nile Basin Initiative, 2012) 
One of the main reasons behind the low yield in upstream Nile Basin countries is 
the lack of fertilizers. Figure 17 shows the 2005 fertilizers consumption in the Nile Basin 
countries. It shows that the Egyptian rate of fertilizers usage is more than twenty fold the 
rate of the second best country which is Kenya. Egypt has a number of fertilizers 
factories and is well-experienced in the production and usage of fertilizers. In order to 
improve the yield in those countries it is recommended that Egypt either exports 
fertilizers to Nile Basin countries or even build fertilizers factories at these countries. 
This is a clear win-win situation which can benefit all countries. 
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Figure 17 – Use of fertilizers in the Nile Basin – 2005 data – developed from (Nile Basin Initiative, 
2012) 
In addition to improving the use of fertilizers, there is a number of measures that 
can be taken in order to improve the yield at upstream countries, including improved 
seeds, adjusting crop intensity and improving water conveyance. Egypt can also through 
its Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation perform research and technology transfer 
through the cooperation between research institutions. Farmers at upstream countries 
need extensive capacity building particularly in the area of soil management. Rain-fed 
areas can make use of improving soil cover and setting up water harvesting structures. 
This would minimize soil erosion and hence improve the soil conditions (Nile Basin 
Initiative, 2012).   
5.4.2 Integration of electricity grids 
Nile Basin countries are endowed with a number of renewable and clean energy 
resources. Nevertheless, most of these countries, especially upstream countries have very 
low levels of electricity access. Excluding Egypt, the rates of electrification range 
between 2 and 30%, with an average consumption of just 77 kWh per capita per year 
(Economic Consulting Associates , 2009), which represents one of the lowest 
consumption rates in the World. The power generation capacities of all Nile Basin 
countries including Egypt is expected to grow significantly over the next few decades. 
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Figure 18 shows the forecasted demand for electricity for the Nile Basin countries up to 
2045. The rise in demand is expected due to improving economic conditions as well as 
population growth. This represents a huge opportunity for cooperation among all the 
basin countries.  
 
Figure 18 – Forecast demand for power for Nile Basin countries 2010-45 (Nile Basin Initiative, 2012) 
The cheapest and most abundant power source in the Nile Basin is hydropower, 
with a potential of more than 20 GW, with only 26% of the potential utilized (Nile Basin 
Initiative, 2012). The building of hydropower facilities should be accompanied with other 
huge investments in transmission and distribution. Through the integration of electricity 
grids in the Nile Basin countries, Egypt can invest in the infrastructure needed for 
transmission and distribution in return for electricity later on delivered to Egypt. This can 
actually be a very successful cooperation model with Ethiopia in the Renaissance Dam 
project.  
80 
5.5 Applying the policy framework to national projects in Egypt and 
international projects in the Nile Basin 
5.5.1 Applying the policy framework to the reclamation of 1.5 million feddans 
project 
To start assessing this project, it should be first discussed at the Supreme Council for 
Water, Energy and Food. During this stage, the roles of each of the concerned Ministries 
should be clear. It is anticipated that the following roles should be agreed by the different 
ministries: 
 Ministry of Agriculture: 
o Plan for the crops that will be cultivated in each of the selected regions 
for the project. In doing so, it should select crops needing minimum water 
requirements. 
o Estimate quantities of water and fertilizers needed based on the selected 
crops. 
o Estimate the quantities of energy needed for water pumping, crop 
harvesting, transportation and processing.   
o Estimate the budget needed for the reclamation of land. 
 Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation:  
o For each region of the project, determine the source of water. 
o In case brackish groundwater will be used, determine the quantities of 
fuel needed for desalination. 
o Determine the budget needed for availing the water resources for the 
project.   
 New and Renewable Energy Authority, under the Ministry of Electricity and 
Renewable Energy:  
o Determine the budget needed for pumping of groundwater using solar 
energy.   
o Study the possibility of groundwater desalination using solar energy and 
determine the needed budget.  
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 Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources:  
o Determine the sources of fossil fuel needed for the implementation of the 
project and the corresponding budget. 
  Ministry of Industry and Trade:  
o Determine which fertilizers plants that will supply the needed fertilizers 
for the project, and in case the existing capacity is not enough determine 
the budget needed for the construction of new plants. 
 Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform: 
o Coordinate the overall planning of the project. 
 Ministry of Environment: 
o Determine the environmental impacts of the project. 
o Propose suitable mitigation measures for the expected impacts in 
coordination with the other Ministries. 
 Ministry of Finance:  
o Calculate the total budget needed for the project based on input from the 
different Ministries. 
o Determine the overall economic feasibility of the project.  
Upon completing the proper Ministerial coordination, the scoring matrix should be 
used to give a ranking to the project as shown in Table 14. 
 Table 14 – Ranking the 1.5 million feddans project based on pre-defined scoring matrix 
Criteria 
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-Criteria 
Sub-
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-
Criteria 
Score (out 
of 10) 
Sub-Criteria 
Score 
Justification 
Criteria 
Score 
Relevance to 
water security 
17.9% 
Sustainability of the water 
resource 
8.95% 4 3.58% 
The project mainly relies on 
groundwater whose sustainability is 
questionable. 
5.4% 
Quantity of water 
needed/produced 
8.95% 2 1.79% 
The project is expected to put more 
stress on the national water resources. 
Relevance to 
energy 
security 
10.7% 
Energy resources 
availability 
3.57% 4 1.43% 
The projects will require significant 
energy resources for primary 
production, transportation and 
processing. 
4.3% Electricity access to 
populations 
3.57% 4 1.43% 
The project will put more stress on 
Egypt's energy resources 
Availability of affordable 
energy to populations 
3.57% 4 1.43% 
The project will put more stress on 
Egypt's energy resources 
Relevance to 
food security 
21.4% 
Impact on food 
availability 
10.71% 10 10.71% 
The project will improve food 
availability in Egypt. 
21.4% 
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Criteria 
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-Criteria 
Sub-
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-
Criteria 
Score (out 
of 10) 
Sub-Criteria 
Score 
Justification 
Criteria 
Score 
Ability of most vulnerable 
households to withstand 
food prices shocks 
10.71% 10 10.71% 
Availability of food produced locally 
will make the most vulnerable 
households in a better situation since 
food prices will not be subject to 
international price fluctuations. 
Relevance to 
climate 
change 
3.6% 
Relevance to climate 
change mitigation 
1.79% 4 0.72% 
Agricultural activities cause 
considerable greenhouse gas 
emissions from the use of energy and 
fertilizers. 
2.5% 
Relevance to climate 
change adaptation 
1.79% 10 1.79% 
Since the project is expected to 
implement new agricultural 
technologies, it will help with climate 
change adaptation. 
Sustainability 
of the project  
17.9% 
Whether a feasibility study 
has been completed 
5.95% 0 0.00% No feasibility study was announced. 
11.9% Availability of 
management capacity 
5.95% 10 5.95% 
Egypt is a well experienced country 
in managing agricultural projects. 
Availability of 
maintenance capacity 
5.95% 10 5.95% 
Egypt has enough human capacity 
and expertise to aintain the project. 
Alignment 
with national 
policies 
10.7% 
Relevance to national 
policy 
framework/strategies/plans 
3.57% 10 3.57% 
The project is in line with the policies 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
10.7% 
Alignment with poverty 
reduction policies 
3.57% 10 3.57% 
The project is expected to have 
positive social impact due to creatin 
of jobs. 
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Criteria 
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-Criteria 
Sub-
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-
Criteria 
Score (out 
of 10) 
Sub-Criteria 
Score 
Justification 
Criteria 
Score 
Alignment with social 
justice and social inclusion   
3.57% 10 3.57% 
Some areas of the project are 
marginalized areas which will help 
with their social inclusion. 
Economic 
Viability 
10.7% 
Availability of budget for 
implementing the project 
5.36% 8 4.29% 
The Egyptian government has 
allocated budget for the project. 
5.4% 
Economic indicators for 
the project 
5.36% 2 1.07% 
Due to the arid nature of Egypt and 
the high cost of obtaining fresh 
water, the project is not expected to 
be economically attractive.  
Environmental 
Impacts 
7.2% 
Whether the project has an 
approved environmental 
impact assessment / 
strategic environmental 
assessment study 
1.79% 0 0.00% 
No EIA/SEA was developed for the 
project. 
2.9% 
Impacts on air quality 1.79% 8 1.43% 
Impacts on air quality are restricted 
to nenergy use which does not make 
it a significant impact. 
Impacts on water quality 1.79% 4 0.72% 
If the project leads to unsustainable 
groundwater withdrawals, this will 
have severe impact on groundwater 
quality. 
Impacts on soil 1.79% 4 0.72% 
Agriculture leads to the deterioration 
of soil quality due to the use of 
fertilizers and pesticides. 
Total     100.00%       64.4% 
 
After that, the project is ready to move to the second round of stakeholders’ 
consultation. Now there is enough information and studies to be presented to the 
stakeholders. This round of stakeholders’ consultation should be done in all governorates 
where the project is planned. The purpose is to present the results of the previous stages 
and receive input from the local populations on their concerns and requirements from the 
project. This will ensure their engagement and give them a sense of ownership of the 
project. After that the project should move to the financing stage where the Ministry of 
Finance should allocate the necessary budget for the project. Then the project should 
move into implementation and monitoring. 
5.5.2 Applying the policy framework to the GERD 
The project should first be discussed at the Nile Basin WEF Council, which is 
formed of the Prime Ministers and the Ministers of water resources, agriculture and 
energy in the Nile Basin Countries. Each country should mention its concerns over the 
project and they should be discussed accordingly. On that basis, technical committees 
should be formed to study the impact of the project on Ethiopia and downstream 
countries. The technical studies should be the basis on which the ranking should take 
place. The scoring matrix should be used to give a ranking to the project as shown in 
Table 15. It should be noted that the scoring in the Table is done from a regional 
perspective of all the countries affected. It was not done from the Egyptian perspective 
only. 
Table 15 – Ranking the GERD project based on pre-defined scoring matrix 
Criteria 
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-Criteria 
Sub-
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-
Criteria 
Score (out 
of 10) 
Sub-Criteria 
Score 
Justification 
Criteria 
Score 
Relevance to 
water security 
17.9% 
Sustainability of the water 
resource 
8.95% 5 4.48% 
The project will improve the water 
security situation of Ethiopia but will 
threaten that of Egypt. 
11.6% 
Quantity of water 
needed/produced 
8.95% 8 7.16% 
The GERD's reservoir will store 
water at better climatic conditions 
than that at Aswan High Dam, with 
much less evaporation. 
Relevance to 
energy 
security 
10.7% 
Energy resources 
availability 
3.57% 8 2.86% 
The project will have an installed 
capacity of 6000 MW, but might 
affect the production of electricity at 
Aswan High Dam. 
10.0% Electricity access to 
populations 
3.57% 10 3.57% 
The project will improve electricity 
access to populations at Ethiopia and 
its neighboring countries. 
Availability of affordable 
energy to populations 
3.57% 10 3.57% 
Large hydro projects produce cheap 
electricity which makes it affordable 
to populations. 
Relevance to 
food security 
21.4% 
Impact on food 
availability 
10.71% 5 5.36% 
The project will improve the food 
security situation of Ethiopia but will 
threaten that of Egypt. 
13.9% 
Ability of most vulnerable 
households to withstand 
food prices shocks 
10.71% 8 8.57% 
The project will help Ethiopia 
overcome the recurring famines. 
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Criteria 
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-Criteria 
Sub-
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-
Criteria 
Score (out 
of 10) 
Sub-Criteria 
Score 
Justification 
Criteria 
Score 
Relevance to 
climate 
change 
3.6% 
Relevance to climate 
change mitigation 
1.79% 9 1.61% 
The project will produce 6000 MW 
of electricity with zero GHG 
emissions. 
2.7% 
Relevance to climate 
change adaptation 
1.79% 6 1.07% 
The project will help Ethiopia with 
climate change adaptation through 
improved production.  
Sustainability 
of the project  
17.9% 
Whether a feasibility study 
has been completed 
5.95% 5 2.98% 
Ethiopia has done its feasibility 
study, but another one should be 
done from a regional perspective.  
12.5% Availability of 
management capacity 
5.95% 8 4.76% 
Operation of large hydro projects is 
not expected to be a challenge. 
Availability of 
maintenance capacity 
5.95% 8 4.76% 
Maintenance of large hydro projects 
is not expected to be a challenge. 
Alignment 
with national 
policies 
10.7% 
Relevance to national 
policy 
framework/strategies/plans 
3.57% 7 2.50% 
The project is aligned with Ethiopia's 
national policies, but is in conflict 
with that of Egypt. 
7.1% 
Alignment with poverty 
reduction policies 
3.57% 7 2.50% 
The project is expected to have a 
great impact om poverty reduction in 
Ethiopia, but might have a negative 
social impact in Egypt. 
Alignment with social 
justice and social inclusion   
3.57% 6 2.14% 
The project will improve the social 
status of marginalized populations in 
Ethiopia. 
Economic 
Viability 
10.7% 
Availability of budget for 
implementing the project 
5.36% 10 5.36% 
Ethiopia has allocated the required 
funds for the project. 
10.7% 
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Criteria 
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-Criteria 
Sub-
Criteria 
Weight 
Sub-
Criteria 
Score (out 
of 10) 
Sub-Criteria 
Score 
Justification 
Criteria 
Score 
Economic indicators for 
the project 
5.36% 10 5.36% 
Large hydro projects produce cheap 
electricity which makes it 
economically viable. 
Environmental 
Impacts 
7.2% 
Whether the project has an 
approved environmental 
impact assessment / 
strategic environmental 
assessment study 
1.79% 5 0.90% 
Ethiopia has completed the project's 
EIA, but another one should be done 
from a regional perspective. 
5.5% Impacts on air quality 1.79% 10 1.79% 
The project is not expected to have 
any significant impact on air quality. 
Impacts on water quality 1.79% 8 1.43% 
The project will have positive impact 
on water quality at Jazeera scheme at 
Sudan due to the removal of silt. 
Impacts on soil 1.79% 8 1.43% 
The project is not expected to have 
any significant impact on soil quality. 
Total     100.00%       74.1% 
   The project should now move to a regional stakeholders’ consultation process, 
since the project will be implemented on a transboundary river. In addition to the 
governmental entities that were involved at the at the initial stage through the Nile Basin 
WEF Council, the stakeholders’ consultation should be attended by the civil society, 
representatives of the public (possible parliament members) and the public at large. 
Ethiopia, the implementing country should try to present evidence that the project will 
not harm Egypt in terms of its water security. In case this is not achieved, Ethiopia can 
present incentives in terms of food and/or energy. The project should be funded by the 
Nile Basin fund only in case a unanimous decision is reached by the member countries.        
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations 
Water, energy and food security are far from being achieved globally. A large 
number of people globally lack basic services, with 0.9 billion people lacking access to 
clean drinking water, 2.6 billion people having no safe sanitation, 1.3 billion people 
without access to electricity, 1.5 billion lacking access to modern forms of energy for 
cooking and 1 billion suffering from hunger regularly. In the future those challenges are 
expected to be even more severe. FAO expects that two thirds of the world’s population 
will suffer from water stress by 2030. It is forecasted by the EIA that the world will need 
40% more energy by 2030 compared to the current levels. The global demand for meat is 
expected by UNEP to increase by 50% by 2025, leading also to a 42% increase in the 
demand for grain. Climate change is expected to increase nexus challenges. Temperatures 
are expected to increase, soil is expected to dry out, storms are expected to intensify and 
glaciers are expected to reduce in size. 
Egypt is a country struggling to achieve water, energy and food security. In terms 
of water, Egypt is mainly relying on the Nile River, from which it currently receives 55.5 
BCM per year as per the 1959 Nile Waters agreement. In the energy sector, Egypt is 
currently experiencing its worst energy crisis in decades. Looking at food security, Egypt 
is a net importing country; it currently imports 45-55% of its wheat consumption, which 
makes it highly vulnerable to international price fluctuations. Egypt is facing another 
major challenge regarding its main water resource Nile River. Ethiopia is currently 
undergoing the construction of a major dam on the Blue Nile: The Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam (GERD).  
Egypt has so far negotiated repeatedly using the argument of its historical rights 
in the Nile water. However, it should be acknowledged that the demography has also 
changed a lot. The Ethiopian population is now already more than the Egyptian 
population. Nevertheless, Ethiopia produces only a fraction of the energy produced by 
Egypt and also a fraction of the GDP produced by Egypt. 
It was demonstrated that the Egyptian policies in the three sectors are incoherent 
and uncoordinated. Accordingly, it is recommended to develop one integrated strategic 
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plan for the WEF nexus, according to which the three sector policies will be aligned. It is 
recommended to initiate a Supreme Council for Water, Energy and Food. The mandate of 
the Supreme Council of WEF will include coordination between all the governmental 
agencies for Water, Energy and Food, including alignment of policies and plans, 
exchange of information, review of projects and programs in each sector, and the 
monitoring of implementation and operation of these projects and programs. Similarly, a 
Nile Basin WEF Council is recommended for the Nile Basin countries, in order to take 
strategic decisions and approve projects and plans. The Nile Basin WEF Council 
decisions should be legally binding to all Nile Basin countries. 
 A policy framework was developed to prioritize projects that are beneficial to the 
WEF nexus. The development of the policy framework shall follow a participatory 
approach involving the different stakeholders during the stage of developing the policy 
and strategic planning framework. In order to assess and prioritize the different projects, 
a digital logic method is used, where the criteria included relevance to water security, 
relevance to energy security, relevance to food security, relevance to climate change, 
sustainability of the project, alignment with national policies, economic viability,  and 
environmental impacts. Afterwards the final projects approval process involves another 
stakeholders’ consultation process, followed by seeking funding for the selected projects. 
 In order to show the importance of the WEF policy framework both on the local 
level in Egypt and the Nile Basin level, several examples were shown that could benefit 
from having the WEF nexus approach. On the local level, it was demonstrated that the 
lack of coordination caused huge delays to the reclamation of 1.5 million feddans project. 
When applying the policy framework to the project, it was demonstrated that the project 
could have taken a much faster track had the necessary coordination among governmental 
entities been done at an early stage. Another example given was the expansion of the 
power generations sector in Egypt, whose efficiency could have been improved by 25% if 
combined power generation and desalination plants were introduced.   
 On the Nile Basin level, it was demonstrated that the water footprint comparative 
advantage can be used to grow crops using the least possible water. In addition, the 
Egyptian expertise in agriculture could be used to improve the very low agricultural yield 
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in upstream countries. Integrating electricity grids in the Nile Basin is also a very 
interesting project. The Egyptian expertise can be utilized in the field of electricity 
generation and transmission from hydropower in return for part of the generated 
electricity going to Egypt. The policy framework suggested was implemented to the 
GERD project. It was demonstrated how Ethiopia can provide incentives to Egypt 
through power and food to compensate Egypt for water shortages due to the dam 
construction. Although the project received a satisfactory score from a regional 
perspective, it is strongly recommended that Egypt makes good use of the project by 
adopting the virtual water concept (e.g. by planting crops and raising cattle in Ethiopia), 
in addition to the integration of electricity grids with Sudan and Ethiopia. 
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